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NOTES

PROTECTING ATrORNEYS AGAINST WRONGFUL
DISCHARGE: EXTENSION OF THE
PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION

INTRODUCTION

According to the at will doctrine, an employer has the unfettered right to discharge its employees.' However, changes in the
modem employment relationship have encouraged legislatures and
courts to modify this rule in an effort to balance the interests of
employers, employees, and society.2 The most widely accepted
judicial modification is wrongful discharge based upon the public
policy exception Under this theory, a plaintiff can recover by

1. Payne v. Western & Atlantic R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884) (stating that
"[employers] may dismiss their employees at will... for good cause, for no cause, or
even for cause morally wrong, without being thereby guilty of legal wrong"), overruled
on other grounds, Hutton v. Watters, 179 S.W. 134 Crenn. 1915). It has been estimated
that a majority of American workers am at will employees. Current Developments in
Wrongful Discharge, ALI-ABA Course of Study, May 3, 1990, available in Westlaw,
C517 ALI-ABA 1, at 5 [hereinafter CurrentDevelopments].
2. See Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 878 (11. 1981) (stating the need to balance the interests of employers, employees, and society); Cornelius J.
Peck, Penetrating Doctrinal Camouflage: Understanding the Development of the Law of
Wrongful Discharge, 66 WAsH. L.REv. 719, 727-34 (1991) (discussing the reasons for
judicially imposed limits on employer power and arguing that courts revised the at will
employment doctrine in order to better balance the employer-employee relationship in the
context of modem society).
3. Note, ProtectingEmployees At Will Against Wrongful Discharge: The Public Policy
Exception, 96 HARV.L. REV. 1931, 1947-50 (1983) [hereinafter Public Policy Exception].
For the purposes of this Note, no distinction will be drawn between wrongful discharge based upon the public policy exception and retaliatory discharge. Wrongful discharge based upon the public policy exception requires a showing that the employee's
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showing that an employer's discharge contravened a clearly mandated public policy. 4 The purpose of the public policy exception is

to protect public policies by protecting employees against arbitrary
and unfair treatment by employers Employees should not be
forced to choose between continuing employment and contravening
public policy.

Like many other employees, non-professionals and professionals alike, attorneys are hired at will.6 This means clients have the
right to discharge their attorneys at any time, for any reason. Un-

like other employees, however, attorneys who are employees7 are
discharge contravened a clearly mandated public policy. Retaliatory discharge is a subset
of the public policy exception. An employee has a claim for retaliatory discharge when 1)
the employer terminates the employee in response to specific action taken by the employee, and 2) the discharge was in contravention of a clearly mandated public policy.
Palmateer, 421 N.E.2d at 881. If there is a distinction between the public policy exception and retaliatory discharge, it is slight for the purposes of this note. An employee relying upon the public policy exception, in essence, argues that his employer fired him in
response to his refusal to contravene public policy or his performance of an act encouraged by public policy. But see Raymis H.C. Kim, Comment, In-House Counsel's Wrongful
Discharge Action Under the Public Policy Exception and Retaliatory Discharge Doctrine,
67 WASH. L. REV. 893, 896, 904 (1992) (arguing that there is an important difference
between the public policy exception and retaliatory discharge and contending that retaliatory discharge should be limited to discharges of employees whose activities harm the employer).
In addition, the purpose of this Note is not to contend that the public policy exception is the best approach to wrongful discharge. Rather, given that the exception exists,
this Note asserts that the exception should be extended to cover attorneys who are employees.
4. See Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25, 27 (Cal. Cr. App.
1959) (allowing, for the first time, a wrongful discharge claim based upon public policy).
5. See Peck, supra note 2, at 744 (stating that courts have used the public policy
exception to limit an employer's decision to terminate employees when violations of public policy are involved).
6. See MODERN LEGAL ETmCS 545 (1986) ("It is now uniformly recognized that the
client-lawyer contract is terminable at will by the client.").
7. This Note does not argue that the public policy exception should be extended to
allattorneys. Rather, it asserts that the public policy exception should only be extended to
attorneys who are employees. Thus, references to attorneys means attorneys who are in an
employer-employee relationship. For example, attorneys employed by corporations are employees of corporations. For cases involving in-house counsel, see Willy v. Coastal Corp.,
647 F. Supp. 116 (S.D. Tex. 1986), rev'd, 855 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir. 1988); Balla v.
Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104 (IiI. 1991); Nordling v. Northern State Power Co., 478
N.W.2d 498 (Minn. 1991); Herbster v. North American Co. for Life & Health Ins., 501
N..2d 343 (I. App. Ct. 1986). Law associates are employees of law firms. See, e.g.,
Wieder v. Skala, 609 N.E.2d 105 (N.Y. 1992). In contrast to these attorneys who are
employees, solo private practitioners are more like independent contractors. Cf.Nordling v.
Northern States Power Co., 465 N.W.2d 81, 87 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991), rev'd, 478
N.W.2d 498 (Minn. 1991) (Kalitowski, J.,concurring in part, dissenting in part) (arguing
that in-house counsel are not analogous to private attorneys). It is beyond the scope of
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denied the right to sue for wrongful discharge based upon the
public policy exception. Courts justify their refusal to deviate from
the at will rule when the plaintiff is an attorney for two basic
reasons. First, extending the public policy exception is unnecessary
because attorneys are bound by an ethical code which adequately
protects the public interest.8 Second, permitting such suits would
impair the attorney-client relationship which is based upon trust
and confidence These justifications raise important issues about a
plaintiff's status as an attorney. However, they do not support an
absolute bar to wrongful discharge suits by attorneys based upon
the public policy exception. Rather, they require courts to modify
their analysis to take into consideration the attorney-client relationship.
This Note argues that the public policy exception should be
extended to attorneys who are employees. Part I discusses the employment at will doctrine and the development of wrongful discharge. Part H examines the public policy exception as a basis for
wrongful discharge claims and attempts to outline the parameters of
the exception. Courts should require plaintiffs to demonstrate that
their discharges violate a specific and fundamental public policy
evidenced by, or discernible within, a statutory or constitutional
provision or administrative rule which has the full force of law.
Part I examines wrongful discharge cases brought by attorneys.
First, this part discusses cases in which courts provide relief to the
attorney by finding an implied contract. These cases illustrate the
courts' desire to provide protection while limiting available remedies. This Note argues that finding an implied-in-law obligation
and breach of contract is not an adequate solution. Next, this part
presents the cases in which courts have directly addressed the issue
of whether the public policy exception should be extended to attorneys. Most courts deny a cause of action. Part IV argues that the
public policy exception should be extended to attorneys. This part
demonstrates that the courts' reliance on ethical codes is not only
inconsistent but unsound. This part also contends that extension of
the public policy exception will not always impair the attorneyclient relationship and that, under certain circumstances, other public policies may deserve more protection. Part V suggests that
this Note to consider whether protection should be extended to attorneys who are not in
an employer-employee relationship.
8. See infra notes 164-89 and accompanying text.
9. Id.
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instead of barring suits by attorneys, courts should modify their

public policy analysis in order to duly consider the attorney-client
relationship.
I.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF WRONGFUL DISCHARGE

A.

Employment At Will Doctrine

According to the employment at will doctrine, an employer
can discharge an employee at will "for good cause, for no cause or

even for cause morally wrong, without being thereby guilty of
legal wrong."'" This doctrine, unique to the United States," developed during the nineteenth century. 2 It marked a departure

from English common law which, in the eighteenth century, presumed that an employment relationship of indefinite duration was a
hiring for one year. 3 During the nineteenth century, this presumption evolved into a rule that, unless otherwise specified, an

employment relationship could only be terminated after a notice
period fixed by the custom in the trade, or after a reasonable time
if there was no custom, 4 provided there was no cause for imme-

diate dismissal.
In contrast, American law developed the at will employment

rule which allowed either party to terminate the employment re-

10. Payne v. Western & Atlantic R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884). overruled on other grounds, Hutton v. Watters, 179 S.W. 134 (Tenn. 1915); see also Speeder Cycle Co.
v. Teeters, 48 N.E. 595, 597 (Ind. App. CL 1897) (noting that discharged, at will employees can only recover wages already earned, and not future wages, because they are not
hired for a specified term); East Line & Red River R.R. v. Scott, 10 S.W. 99, 102 (Tex.
1888) (stating that when an employer and an employee have not agreed on a specific
length of employment, the hiring is at will).
11. See William L. Mauk, Wrongful Discharge: The Erosion of 100 Years of Employer
Privilege, 21 IDAHO L. REv. 201, 204 (1985) (stating that unlike other major industrial
countries, the United States has failed to develop job protection for all employees); Clyde
W. Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time For a Statute, 62 VA.
L. REV. 481, 508-19 (1976) (stating that the United States is one of the few nations
which does not protect workers from unjust termination); Note, Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93
HAIV. L. REV. 1816, 1844 (1980) [hereinafter Duty to Terminate].
12. The at will rule is often traced to Horace Wood. According to Wood, "a general
or indefinite hiring is prima facie a hiring at will, and if the servant seeks to make it out
[sic] a yearly hiring, the burden is upon him to establish it by proof." HORACE WOOD, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW Or- MASTER AND SERvANT 282-86 (1886). However, the rule

existed in several states before Wood published his treatise. See, e.g., Prentiss v. Ledyard,
28 Wis. 131, 133 (1871).
13. WooD, supra note 12, at 282-86 (comparing the English and American rules);
Mauk, supra note 11, at 203.
14. Peck, supra note 2, at 721.
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lationship at any time for any reason. 5 By the twentieth century
this rule had been readily adopted throughout the United States. Its
emergence fit the conditions and philosophy prevalent at the end of
the nineteenth century.' 6 The country was experiencing tremendous
economic growth, and arguably, at will employment helped promote growth and entrepreneurship by protecting employers and
giving them greater freedom to end the employment relationship.17
Allowing employers this freedom gave them the ability to allocate
their resources efficiently and to adapt to changing economic conditions. At the same time, however, it provided no protection for
employees.
The at will rule also promoted prevailing notions of laissezfake, economic individualism, and freedom of contract, all of
which supported an employer's right to control his own business
and an employee's right to freely negotiate with his employer."
At will employment presumed that both the employer and employee could contract to protect themselves. As a result, without an
explicit statement of a definite term, the employer and employee
could terminate the relationship regardless of the reason, without
interference from the law. The Supreme Court supported the notion
that regulation of the employer-employee relationship interfered
with both parties' freedom to contract. 9 In one decision, the

15. The development of the at will doctrine meant that unionized employees found
themselves in a more favorable position than non-unionized employees. W'illiam B. Gould
IV, The Idea of the Job as Property in Contemporary America: The Legal and Collective
BargainingFramework, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REv. 885, 887-89. Through collective bargaining,
union employees negotiated agreements that contained just cause provisions and rules
which affected promotions and transfers. Id. at 889. These agreements limited an
employer's right to discharge unionized employees. In contrast, the at will employee was
without any protection and, thus, subject to the employer's power which could be exercised in an arbitrary and unfair way.
16. See Daniel A. Mathews, Note, A Common Law Action for the Abusively Discharged Employee, 26 HASINGS L. 1435, 1440 (1975) (stating that the at will doctrine
facilitated industrialization by minimizing employee rights upon discharge); Duty to Terminate, supra note 11, at 1825-26 (noting that the at will doctrine fit the nineteenth century
notion of laissez-faire economics).
17. See Mathews, supra note 16, at 1441 (describing an American belief that freedom
of the marketplace would stimulate economic growth and benefit all of society).
18. Id.; see also Duty to Terminate, supra note 11, at 1825-26 (noting that proponents
of the at will rule often argue that it promotes entrepreneurship by not imposing burdensome legal duties on parties to an employment contract).
19. See Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 26 (1915) (holding unconstitutional a Kansas
statute which made it a misdemeanor to require employees to agree not to join a union);
Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 172-75 (1908) (holding unconstitutional a federal
statute which made it illegal to discharge an employee for joining a union). These deci-
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Court explained:
The right of the employee to quit the service of the employer for whatever reason, is the same as the right of the
employer, for whatever reason, to dispense with the services of such employee ....
In all such particulars the employer and employee have equality of right, and any legislation that disturbs equality is an arbitrary interference with
the liberty of contract.... '
The legal profession was no exception to this rule. Attorneys
were hired at will. As one court stated, "[ilt is well established in
the case of the client that he may at any time for any reason
which seems satisfactory to him, however arbitrary, discharge his
attorney."' Acceptance and application of the at will rule to attorneys occurred at a time when most attorneys practiced alone ' and
when the development of the large law firm and the notion of the
corporate attorney were just beginning to emerge.'s Presumably
then, attorneys had numerous clients and were, therefore, not dependent upon a single client or employer.
B.

Erosion of the At Will Rule and Development of
Wrongful Discharge

Although employment at will remains the rule today, changes
in modem employment conditions have prompted statutory and judicial modifications over the last twenty years 4 Well over half of

sions were repudiated in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 45 (1937).
See also Duty to Terminate, supra note 11, at 1826 (discussing the Supreme Court's

efforts to protect contract rights in both its Adair and Coppage decisions); J. Peter
Shapiro & James F. Tune, Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26 STAN. L.
REv. 335, 346-47 (1974) (stating that the Supreme Court's support for the at will rule in

the nineteenth century was founded on its belief in an individual's right to contract).
20. Adair, 208 U.S. at 174-75.
21. In re Dunn, 98 N.E. 914, 916 (N.Y. 1912); see also Lawler v. Dunn, 176 N.W.

989, 990 (Minn. 1920) (stating that clients can discharge their attorneys with or without
cause).
22. Wayne K. Hobson, Symbol of the New Profession: Emergence of the Large Law
Firm, in THE NEw HIGH PRIESS: LAWYERS IN POST-CIvIL WAR AMEmRcA 3 (Gerard W.

Gawalt ed., 1984) (stating that by 1930 most lawyers still practiced alone or with one
partner).
23. WAYNE K. HOBSON, THB AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION AND Tme ORGANIZATIONAL SOCIETY, 1890-1930, at 141-208 (1986) (discussing the development of the large law
firm between 1890 and 1930).
24. Gould, supra note 15, at 895-99 (discussing factors which influenced recent chang-

es in employment at will).
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the states have modified or have recognized exceptions to the at
will rule. These modifications give an employee the right to sue
for wrongful discharge under contract or tort theories, and, thereby,
curb an employer's unfettered right to discharge employees. The
gradual erosion of the at will doctrine resulted from changes in the
employment relationship and increasing awareness of employee vulnerability to employer coercion.s
The modem employment relationship is vastly different than it
was when the at will doctrine emerged in the nineteenth century.'
Today the opportunity for self-employment has declined, corporations have grown,29 and "[o]ly the most unusual employee possesses sufficient bargaining power to insist upon a restriction of the
dismissal power. ' Many jobs are on a take-it or leave-it basis,
meaning individuals must take the job under terms set by the employer or not at all.' Due to the scarcity of jobs, those seeking

25. Current Developments, supra note 1, at 5.
26. See Mauk, supra note 11, at 204-05 (stating that the economic circumstances
which justified the at will doctrine no longer exist); Peck, supra note 2, at 720 (arguing
that courts modified the at will rule due to changes in the law which stressed the importance of Americans' interest in employment and illustrated that the at will doctrine was
an "anachronism"); Mathews, supra note 16, at 1443-46 (contending that the employee in
a modem employment relationship is unable to contract against wrongful discharge).
27. Lawrence E. Blades notes the importance of employer power by referring to an
often quoted passage:
WJe have become a nation of employees. We are dependent upon others for
our means of livelihood, and most of our people have become completely dependent upon wages. If they lose their jobs they lose every resource, except for
the relief supplied by the various forms of social security. Such dependence of
the mass of the people upon others for all of their income is something new
in the world. For our generation, the substance of life is in another man's
hands.
Lawrence E. Blades, Employment At Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive
Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 1404, 1404 (1967) (quoting F.
Tannenbaum).
28. Mauk, supra note 11, at 204 (noting that today 90% of Americans are employees);
Shapiro & Tune, supra note 19, at 337-38.
29. Blades, supra note 27, at 1404 (stating "[IUt is a widely accepted proposition that
large corporations now pose a threat to individual freedom comparable to that which
would be posed if governmental power were unchecked:).
30. Mathews, supra note 16, at 1443; see also Gould, supra note 15, at 892-95 (discussing the power relationship between employer and employee as an element when considering the modification of the at will rule).
31. See Mathews, supra note 16, at 1443 (stating that in most cases terms of employment are imposed on a take-it or leave-it basis). But see Duty to Terminate, supra
note 11, at 1829-34 (arguing that this rationale for judicial intervention is problematic and
that the at will rule should not be altered due to unequal bargaining power but due to
inefficiency).
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employment cannot afford to turn down offers, regardless of the

terms? 2 Individuals already employed cannot easily refuse to work
under particular conditions or to follow an employer's demand.
These employees lack the luxury of being able to move from job
to job, and immobility weakens their bargaining power?3
The importance of employment increases the gravity of an

employee's lack of bargaining power in the modem employment
relationship. 4 Employment is critical because it provides income
needed to obtain necessities, shapes the aspirations and beliefs of
the employee and his family, and defines one's social status and
identity. With these changes in the employer-employee relation-

ship emerged the awareness that the at will rule was unsuited for
modem conditions'
As changes in the modem employment relationship have taken
place and given rise to erosion of the at will rule, shifts in the
legal profession have made those changes increasingly relevant to

attorneys because more and more attorneys are employees confronted with similar problems.

According to the American Bar

Foundation's Statistical Profile of the United States Legal Profession, the number of in-house attorneys has increased.37 Presently,
ten percent of attorneys, or over 55,000 attorneys, are employed in
private industry?' The number of solo practitioners has
decreased,39 and the number of attorneys in law firms has in32. Blades, supra note 27, at 1405.
33. See id. (explaining that as modem technology advances, and specialization increases, employee immobility will become more of a problem); see also Shapiro & Tune,
supra note 19, at 338 (noting that job immobility is partly due to seniority policies used
by employers to increase work force stability).
34. See Gould, supra note 15, at 892 (acknowledging that employment is central to an
individual's "existence and dignity"); Mathews, supra note 16, at 1444-45 (arguing that
employment is critical to a person's social status, identity, and self-esteem).
35. Gould, supra note 15, at 892; Mathews, supra note 16, at 1444-45.
36. See Mauk, supra note 11, at 204 (arguing that the conditions which once justified
at will employment no longer exist); Peck, supra note 2, at 724-25 (pointing to a new
climate in employer-employee relationships and arguing that the at will employment rule
is now obsolete); see also Mathews, supra note 16, at 1446 (noting that in the 1930s,
application of the at will rule declined as the judiciary and the legislature began to more
heavily regulate the employer-employee relationship).
37. See Ethical Considerationsfor the Corporate Legal Counsel, ALI-ABA Course of
Study, Dec. 6, 1990, available in Westlaw, C566 ALI-ABA 109, at 11 [hereinafter Corporate Legal Counsel].
38. Id.
39. While in 1930 most attorneys practiced alone or with one other partner, today only
about 52% of attorneys are solo practitioners or practicing with one other partner. BARBARA CuRRAN & CLARA N. CARSON, SUPPLEmENT TO THE LAWYER STATISTCAL REPORr.
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creased.' In essence, these changes demonstrate that today more
attorneys are employees: "'Instead of client and lawyer the relation
of employer and employee has been substituted .... A great
many of our lawyers, those who are now exercizing great weight
and influence in the country, are employees."' 4 ' However, despite
this fact, most courts refuse to deviate from the general rule which
permits clients to discharge their dttomeys for any reason or no
reason.
C. Statutory Modifications
The unjust results produced by strict application of the employment at will doctrine led to statutory modifications of the rule at
the federal and state level. Since the 1960s, Congress has passed
many federal statutes which limit an employer's absolute right to
discharge an employee.42 Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to discharge an employee because of race, color, religion,
gender, or national origin.43 The Age Discrimination in Employment Act prohibits an employer from terminating an employee on
the basis of age.' Several federal statutes contain whistle blower
provisions which protect employees against termination in retaliation for reporting illegal conduct.45
State legislatures also have made inroads into the at will rule
by enacting statutes which restrict an employer's right to discharge
employees.' The District of Columbia has a statute which prevents employers from firing employees for reasons other than individual merit. It lists fifteen, non-exclusive, protected categories,
including race, religion, personal appearance, sexual orientation, and

Tm U.S. LEGAL PROFESSION IN 1988, at 21-22 (1991); Hobson, supra note 22, at 3.

40. See, e.g., CURRAN & CARSON, supra note 39, at 21-22 (showing that in 1988
approximately 50% of all attorneys worked in law finns); Hobson, supra note 22, at 7
(noting the increase in large law firms over the last century).

41. Hobson, supra note 22, at 4 (quoting James D. Andrews' speech to the American
Bar Association in 1906 when the notions of the large law film and corporate attorney
were just developing).

42. See Current Developments, supra note 1, at 6-8 (reviewing federal statutes which
have modified the at will rule).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988).

44. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1988).
45. For instance, the following statutes contain whistleblower provisions: Fair Labor
Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (1988); Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29
U.S.C. § 660(c) (1988); Air Pollution Prevention and Control Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7622(a)

(1988).
46. See Current Developments, supra note 1,at 8-11 (reviewing state laws which limit

an employer's unfettered right to discharge employees).
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political affiliation.47 Many states have passed legislation which
protects employees who file workers compensation claims.8
In addition, states have enacted legislation to protect whistleblowers in order to promote disclosure under certain circumstances 4 The breadth of these statutes varies. For example, the New

York whistleblowing statute provides limited protection for employees against retaliatory discharge5 The statute includes only public
health and safety whistleblowing and requires the employee to be

correct-a violation must have taken place."' In contrast, states
such as Connecticut and Illinois have broader whistleblowing statutes. Connecticut protects employees who report violations or suspected violations of any law or regulationS Illinois law protects
employees who disclose information that they reasonably believe
demonstrates mismanagement, extreme waste of funds, abuse of
authority, or substantial danger to public safety, providing the

disclosure is not prohibited by law

3

47. Human Rights Act, D.C CODE ANN. § 1-2501 (1992).
48. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 132a (West Supp. 1994); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.205
(West 1991); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 287.780 (Vernon 1993).
49. See, e.g., ?ICH. Cop. LAWS ANN. §§ 15.361-15.369 (West Supp. 1993); NJ.
STAT. ANN. § 34:19-3 (West Supp. 1993); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740 (McKinney 1988);
TEmN. CODE ANN. § 50-1-304 (1991).
50. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740(2)(a) (McKinney 1988).
51. The statute provides that:
[Ain employer shall not take any retaliatory personnel action against an employee because such employee ...
discloses, or threatens to disclose ...
an
activity, policy or practice of the employer that is in violation of law, rule or
regulation which violation creates and presents a substantial and specific danger
to the public health or safety ....
Id.
52. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51m(6) (West Supp. 1993) (providing that "[n]o
employer shall discharge ...
any employee because the employee ...
reports, verbally
or in writing, a violation or suspected violation of any state or federal law or regulation
or any municipal ordinance or regulation to a public body").
53. ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. § 415/19c.1 (Smith-Hurd 1993). The statute reads:
In any case involving any disclosure of information by an employee which the
employee reasonably believes evidences (i) a violation of any law, rule, or regulation; or
(ii) mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of
authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety .. . [n]o disciplinary action shall be taken versus any employee for
the disclosure ....
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JudicialModifications

Courts have modified the at will rule by recognizing wrongful
discharge claims founded upon contract and tort theories, or a
combination of the two.s Depending upon the jurisdiction, different contract theories can be used as the basis of a claim. Some
courts are willing to find implied contracts in cases where the
employer has made promises or assurances to the employee5 s
These promises can be made orally or in writing, such as company
manuals. Courts in California and Massachusetts have held that
every contract contains a covenant of good faith and fair
dealing.56 Under this theory, the employee can recover contract
damages by demonstrating that the employer terminated the relationship in bad faith.
Many courts recognize a limit on an employer's unfettered
right to discharge an employee under a tort theory. Some wrongful
discharge claims are based upon an allegation of intentional infliction of emotional distress;' but in most cases, courts limit the at
will rule through the public policy exceptionss In essence, a
breach of public policy is a breach of duty imposed by law, 9
thus giving the aggrieved employee a cause of action in tort.

54. See Current Developments, supra note I, at 11-15 (discussing implied contracts
from the employer's oral and written assurances); Peck, supra note 2, at 734-49 (discussing current contract and public policy theories used by the courts).
55. See, e.g., Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 292 N.W.2d 880, 885 (Mich.
1980) (holding that contract provision may become part of the contract either by express
agreement, oral or written, or by the employee's legitimate expectations created by the
employer's policy statements); Weiner v. McGraw-Hill Inc., 443 N.E.2d 441, 442 (N.Y.
1982) (recognizing a breach of contract claim where employee was discharged without
cause or rehabilitative efforts set forth in employer's personnel handbook).
56. See Cleary v. American Airlines Inc., 168 Cal. Rptr. 722, 728 (Cal. Ct. App.
1980) ("'iThere is an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in every contract
that neither party will do anything which will injure the right of the other to receive the
benefits of the agreement.'"); Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251,
1256 (Mass. 1977) ("Good faith and fair dealing between parties are pervasive requirements in our law;, it can be said fairly, that parties to contracts or commercial transactions
are bound by this standard:); see also Duty to Terminate, supra note 11, at 1836-44 (arguing that courts can provide a remedy by implying a duty to terminate only in good
faith).
57. See, e.g., Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 355 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1976) (holding that
a cause of action existed for an intentional infliction of severe emotional distress without
physical injury).
58. See Public Policy Exception, supra note 3, at 1931 (stating that the most widely
accepted limitation on the at will rule is the public policy exception).
59. Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 417 A.2d 505, 512 (NJ. 1980).
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PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION TO EMPLOYMENT AT WILL AS
THE BASIS FOR A WRONGFUL DISCHARGE CLAIM

The majority of states recognizing wrongful discharge claims
based upon the public policy exception generally agree that an

employer cannot fire an employee for refusing to contravene public
policy or performing an act encouraged by public policy.'

The

rationale for this exception "rests on the recognition that in a civilized society the rights of each person are necessarily limited by
the rights of others and of the public at large."'" More specifically, an employer's right to discharge is restricted by the rights of
employees and society. An employer cannot use the threat of discharge to coerce employees to commit illegal acts, conceal wrongdoing, or act against the public interest. 62

Though the general concept of the public policy exception
seems easy to articulate and understand, its application has been
difficult. This difficulty is clearly illustrated by courts implementing
the public policy exception and creating a pattern of incoherent
and, seemingly, arbitrary decisions.63 The problem courts have

faced lies in defining public policy. As the first court to recognize
the public policy exception admitted, "[the term 'public policy' is
inherently not subject to precise definition."'
Different courts have developed different definitions for the
term public policy. The Supreme Court of Illinois has stated that

"public policy concerns what is right and just and what affects the
citizens of the State collectively."' s A California court reasoned
that public policy embodied the notion "that no citizen can lawful-

60. There are several broad categories of public policy exceptions: refusing to commit
an unlawful act; exercising a statutory or constitutional right; performing an important
public obligation; and reporting illegal conduct. However, some courts refuse to recognize
a cause of action for wrongful discharge based upon the public policy exception. See,
e.g., Hinrichs v. Tranquilaire Hosp. 352 So.2d 1130, 1131 (Ala. 1977); De Marco v.
Publix Super Markets, Inc., 384 So.2d 1253, 1254 (Fla. 1980); Murphy v. American
Home Prod. Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86, 87 (N.Y. 1983).
61. Gantt v. Sentry Ins., 824 P.2d 680, 686-87 (Cal. 1992).
62. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 376 (Cal. 1988) (en banc).
63. See Public Policy Exception, supra note 3, at 1947-50 (arguing that judicial decisions regarding the public policy exception have been incoherent, discretionary, and arbiwary).
64. Petermann v. International Bd. of Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25, 27 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1959) (citation omitted). "Mhe Achilles heel of the principle lies in the definition of
public policy." Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 878 (11. 1981).
65. Palmateer, 421 N.E.2d at 878-79.
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ly do that which has a tendency to be injurious to the public or
against the public good. ' The Supreme Court of Oregon concluded that "there can be circumstances in which an employer
discharges an employee for such a socially undesirable motive that
the employer must respond in damages for any injury done."'
Yet another definition is that "a clearly mandated public policy... strikes at the heart of a citizen's social right, duties and
responsibilities."6 Such definitions provide little guidance for determining which public policies are of such magnitude that employees deserve protection.
Courts have tried to define the scope of public policy by limiting the sources from which an employee can derive a public policy. Many courts require the plaintiff to demonstrate that a public
policy is expressed in a specific statute or constitution,69 while
other courts accept non-legislative sources such as ethical codes
and judicial decisions as expressions of public policy. 0 Despite
efforts to define the boundaries of public policy, its meaning remains nebulous and sketchy. As a result, uncertainty, vagueness,
and inconsistency created by judicial decisions about the public
policy exception have left employers and employees uncertain
about their rights and obligations to each other and society.
Though a precise definition may be difficult to establish, it is
possible to create parameters which define the public policy exception. These parameters must be created in light of the ends which
are sought to be achieved by use of the exception. In the wrongful
discharge context, courts struggle to balance the rights and interests
of employers, employees, and society.7' Employers have an inter66. Petennann, 344 P.2d at 27 (quoting Safeway Store v. Retail Clerks Int. Ass'n, 261
P.2d 721, 726 (Cal. 1953)).
67. Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512, 515 (Or. 1975).
68. Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894, 899 (3d Cir. 1983) (quoting
Palmateer, 421 N.E.2d at 878-79).
69. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Wells Fargo Realty Advisors, 199 Cal. Rptr. 613, 618 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1984); Schultz v. Production Stamping Corp., 434 N.W.2d 780, 783 (Wis. 1989).
70. See, e.g., Dabbs v. Cardiopulmonary Management Servs., 234 Cal. Rptr. 129, 133

(Cal. Ct. App. 1987); Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 417 A.2d 505, 512 (NJ.
1980).
71. See Palmateer, 421 N.E.2d at 878 (stating the need to balance the interests of

employers, employees, and society); Broclkneyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 834,
841 (Wis. 1983) (stating that the public policy exception balances interests of employers,
employees, and society); Peck, supra note 2, at 727-34 (discussing the reasons for judicially imposed limits on employer power and arguing that courts revised the at will employment doctrine in order to better balance the employer-employee relationship in the
context of modem society); Shapiro & Tune, supra note 19 (discussing the balancing ap-
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est in knowing that they have broad discretion to manage their
businesses.' This includes the right to retain qualified and competent employees and the right to discharge inadequate employees
without fear of litigation. Employees seek job security, protection
against arbitrary and unfair treatment, and protection against employer coercion7' Employees should not be forced to choose between contravening public policy and continuing employment. The
public has an interest in balancing the interests of the employer
and employee.74 On the one hand, society derives a benefit from
profitable and efficient businesses and a more stable job marketO5
On the other, it benefits from compliance with its basic policies,
laws, and values.
Although society wants its citizens to do what is "right and
just," rewarding an employee for voluntary moral behavior can
often threaten an employer's ability to efficiently manage his business. A case which illustrates the tension between these competing
interests is Palmateer v. International Harvester Co. 6 In
Palmateer, the plaintiff alleged that he was fired for providing
local law enforcement authorities with information about another
employee who was suspected of violating the criminal code and for
agreeing to assist in the investigation and trial if necessary. The
court held that the plaintiff had a cause of action for wrongful
discharge because there is no public policy more fundamental than
enforcing a state's criminal code and protecting the lives and property of citizens7' The court recognized that its decision did not
rest upon any statutory or constitutional provision which required
citizens to report criminal activities,78 but it stated that public policy supported "citizen crime-fighters."
The majority's opinion reflects society's desire to protect those

proach between employee's right to job security and employer's right to terminate).
72. See Palmateer, 421 N.E.2d at 878 (arguing that employers need freedom to run
efficient businesses); Brockmeyer, 335 N.W.2d at 841 (adopting a narrow public policy

exception in order to give employers flexibility in hiring).
73. See Brockraeyer, 335 N.W.2d at 841 (adopting a narrow public policy exception in
order to safeguard employees from employers' actions which impinge on fundamental
public policies).
74. See Palmateer, 421 N.E.2d at 878 (arguing that unchecked power in the hands of

the employer or employee threatens public policy).
75. Brockmeyer, 335 N.W.2d at 841.
76. 421 N.E.2d 876 (Ill. 1981).

77. Id. at 879.
78. Id. at 880.
79. Id.
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who report wrongdoing. However, although the outcome seems
proper, arguably, it fails to adequately address the interests of the
employer. Dissenting, Justice Ryan attacked the majority opinion
and expressed valid criticisms about loose application of the public
policy exception. In Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc.,"0 Justice Ryan wrote
the court's opinion which upheld a plaintiffs right to sue for
wrongful discharge when she alleged that she was terminated for
filing a worker's compensation claim. However, he declined to
agree with the majority in Palmateer because the public policy
enunciated by the court could not be found in any legislative expression. Courts must consider the expectations and interests of
both the employee and employer, and "[i]n the process of emerging
from the harshness of the former [at will] rule, we must guard
against swinging the pendulum to the opposite extreme."'" Justice
Ryan expressed concern about the use of wrongful discharge based
upon the public policy exception and its effect on business.' He
argued that a judicially created public policy in this case only
serves to hamper an employer's ability to discharge an unwanted
employee "who could be completely disruptive of labor-management relations
through his police spying and citizen crime-fighter
activities. ' s
Given that public policy is such a nebulous concept and that
employers and employees are uncertain as to their obligations to
one another and society, it is crucial to create guidelines which
help define the term, keeping in mind the need to balance the
competing interests. Courts should narrow the scope of the public
policy exception by requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate that their
discharges violate a specific and fundamental public policy evidenced by, or discernible within, a statutory or constitutional provi-

80. 384 N.E.2d 353 (111.1978).
81. Palmateer,421 N.E.2d at 884 (Ryan, J., dissenting).

82. In his dissent, Justice Ryan quoted Professor Blades who supported broader use of
wrongful discharge but recognized the adverse effects of litigation on a business.
irhere is the danger
believe, the employee.
disgruntled employees
potential for vexatious

that the average jury will identify with, and therefore
This possibility could give rise to vexatious lawsuits by
fabricating plausible tales of employer coercion. If the
suits by discharged employees is too great, employers

will be inhibited in exercising their best judgment as to which employees

should or should not be retained ....
[Tihe employer's prerogative to make
independent, good faith judgments about employees is important in our free enterprise system.
Id. at 885 (citation omitted).
83. Id.
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sion or administrative rule or regulation which has the full force of
law."
A rule which roots public policy in statutes, constitutions, and
administrative rules protects the interests of employers, employees,
and society.s Employers are given some standards with which to
determine or predict whether a discharge constitutes a violation of

public policy. Their fear of endless litigation by terminated employees is diminished because groundless suits are discouraged by
requiring reference to certain sources of public policy. Requiring

statutory, constitutional, or administrative expression of public
policy also promotes employees' interests by providing job security.
It becomes clear that an employer cannot discharge an employee
for refusing to commit an illegal act,"5 for exercising a statutory

84. Not all administrative rules have the full effect of the law. The definition of the
word "rule" demonstrates the many functions an administrative rule can serve.
'[Riule' means the whole or a part of an agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy or describing the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of an agency and includes the approval or prescription for the future
of rates, wages, corporate or financial structures or reorganizations thereof,
prices, facilities, appliances, services or allowances therefore or of valuations,
costs, or accounting, or practices bearing on any of the foregoing.
5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1988).
In Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n., 506 F.2d 33, 37-40 (D.C.
Cir. 1974), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit discussed the distinction between a substantive rule and a general statement of policy. "A properly adopted substantive rule establishes a standard of conduct which has the force of law." Id. at 38. However, a general statement of policy does not have the effect of law. Rather, it "only announces what the agency seeks to establish as policy." Id. For the purposes of this Note,
references to administrative rules upon which a discharged employee can rely am those
rules which have the full force of law.
85. This Note argues that statutes, constitutions, and administrative rules are valid
sources of public policy. However, simply relying upon a provision fhor one of these
sources is not sufficient. The plaintiff must be able to support her claim with a specific
and fundamental public policy found in one of the sources.
86. Courts have recognized wrongful discharge claims for refusing to commit an illegal
act in a variety of circumstances. See, e.g., Woodson v. AMP Leisureland Centers Inc.,
842 F.2d 699, 700 (3d Cir. 1988) (employee refused to sell liquor to intoxicated patron);
McNulty v. Borden, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 1111, 1121 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (refusing to participate in an illegal price-fixing scheme); Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 427 A.2d
385, 386 (Conn. 1980) (insisting that employer comply with the state Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act); Trombetta v. Detroit, Toledo & Ironton R.R. Co, 265 N.W.2d 385, 386
(Mich. Ct. App. 1978) (employee refused to manipulate pollution sample results);
O'Sullivan v. Mallon, 390 A.2d. 149, 149 (NJ. Super. CL Law Div. 1978) (employee
refused to perform a catherization procedure without the proper training); Johnson v.
Kreiser's, Inc., 433 N.W.2d 225, 226 (S.D. 1988) (employee refused to allow the
corporation's president to use corporation property for personal use). But see Naqvi v.
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or constitutional right,' or for fulfilling a duty imposed by law 8
Society also benefits from the balancing of employer and employee
interests and the protection of fundamental public policies. Both
parties are made aware of their obligations and responsibilities, and
both can fulfill those duties without fear of retaliation or improper
action by the other. Requiring a statutory, constitutional, or administrative expression of public policy makes the standards for
wrongful discharge more understandable and manageable, and it is
a way "to accommodate the legitimate
expectations of both [the
89
employers and the employees]."
A leading case which balances the competing interests and
illustrates the advantages of requiring plaintiffs to point to certain
sources of public policy is Petermann v. InternationalBrotherhood
of Teamsters.' In Petermann, the employer instructed the employee to testify falsely before a government committee. After the
employee testified truthfiflly, the employer discharged him. The
California Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's ruling that
the plaintiff failed to state a claim.9 It recognized that the employer had broad discretion to terminate employees but, stated that
statutory and public policy concerns limited this discretion.' Perjury was a crime, and allowing an employer to discharge an employee who refused to break the law was contrary to the public
welfare. "It would be obnoxious to the interests of the state and
contrary to public policy and sound morality to allow an employer

Oudensha America, Inc., 702 F. Supp. 671, 672 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (holding that employee

who refused to participate in illegal activities which violated the Internal Revenue Code
did not state a public policy upon which to base his claim), rey'd, 897 F.2d 531 (7th

Cir. 1990).
87. See, e.g., Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894, 896 (3d Cir. 1983) (employee fired for refusing to participate in political lobbying); Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 384
N.E.2d 353, 357 (Il. 1978) (holding that employer cannot discharge employee for filing
workers compensation claim). But see Segal v. Arrow Indus. Corp., 364 So.2d 89, 89
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (refusing to recognize cause of action for employee at will
who was discharged for filing workers compensation claim).

88. See, e.g., Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512, 516 (Or. 1975) (employee discharged for
participating in jury duty); Field v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 565 A.2d 1170, 1172 (Pa.
Super. CL 1989) (cause of action where employee, hired as expert in nuclear safety, was
discharged for making statutorily required report); Reuther v. Fowler & Williams Inc., 386
A.2d 119, 121 (Pa. Super. CL 1978) (employee discharged for serving on jury).
89. Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 884 (131.1981) (Ryan, L,
dissenting).
90. 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
91. IkL at 28.
92. ld. at 27.
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on the ground that the employee

.declined to commit perjury, an act specifically enjoined by statute."93 Thus, even though the statute was penal and did not provide an individual with a remedy, the court held that the plaintiff
was entitled to civil relief due to the public policy of encouraging
truthful testimony.94

Although some courts limit sources of public policy to statutory and constitutional provisions,' allowing employees to rely also
upon administrative rules or regulations" is justified because such
rules can have the effect of law and are promulgated by govern-

ment agencies pursuant to legislatively conferred authority.'

In

Winkelman v. Beloit Memorial Hospital," the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin found that a cause of action existed where a hospital
discharged a nurse for refusing to render services for which she
was not qualified. The hospital wanted the plaintiff to "float' to a

particular unit." However, the plaintiff lacked the qualifications
required by a state administrative rule to work in that particular
area. The plaintiff did not work in the unit,'" and shortly thereafter, the hospital terminated her.

The court held that the administrative rule embodied a welldefined public policy that nurses should only render services for
which they are qualified."' The court explained that public policy
exceptions can be found in administrative rules as well as statutes

93. Id. (emphasis added).
94. Id.
95. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Wells Fargo Realty Advisors, 199 Cal. Rptr. 613, 618 (Cal.
Ct App. 1984); Schultz v. Production Stamping Corp., 434 N.W.2d 780, 783 (Wis. 1989).
96. See supra note 84.
97. See, e.g., Boyle v. Vista Eyewear, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 859, 860 (Mo. Ct App. 1985)
(plaintiff stated a cause of action where he was discharged for reporting violations of
federal eyeglass testing regulations); O'Sullivan v. Mallon, 390 A.2d 149, 149 (NJ. Super.
Ct. Law Div. 1978) (recognizing wrongful discharge claim by x-ray technician who refused to catherize a patient due to medical regulations); Winkelman v. Beloit Memorial
Hosp., 483 N.W.2d 211, 212 (Wis. 1992) (nurse terminated for refusing to work in particular unit because she lacked the training and education required by an administrative

rule).
98. 483 N.W.2d 211 (Wis. 1992).
99. Maternity nurses floated into areas which needed more help. Id. at 212.
100. Evidence on this point was conflicting. The plaintiff testified that her head nurse
gave her three options: float, find a replacement, or take an unexcused absence day. The
head nurse stated that she gave plaintiff two options: float or find a replacement. Id. at
213.
101. Id. at 216.
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and constitutions."° In this case, the public policy was clear and
fundamental: patients should only be given care by those who are
qualified. The court did not rely upon the general administrative
rule which stated that the Board of Nursing should discipline negligent nurses. Rather, it relied upon a more specific rule which stated that negligence includes "[ojffering or performing services as a
licensed practical nurse or registered nurse for which the licensee
or registrant is not qualified by education, training or experience.""Ito Winkelman demonstrates that, like statutes, administrative
rules can contain fundamental and specific public policies which
improper discharges can undermine. This, coupled with the fact
that administrative rules can have the full force of law, provides
support for including administrative rules as a source of public
policy.
Some courts have expanded sources of public policies to include ethical codes, c'° however such expansion does not seem
justified."0 5 Given that all citizens are expected to abide by the
law, it is reasonable to require employers to know the law and to
act within its confines. It is reasonable to demand that they not undermine or frustrate the policies behind those laws by discharging
employees. In contrast, ethical codes lack the full force of law and

102. Id. at 215.
103. Id. at 213 (quoting Wis. ADMIN. CODE § N. 7.03(l)(g)) (Dec. 1993).
104. See, e.g., Warthen v. Toms River Community Memorial Hosp., 488 A.2d 229, 23233 (NJ. Super. CL App. Div. 1985) (discussing when an ethical code can serve as a
source of public policy), cert. denied, 501 A.2d 926 (NJ. 1985); Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 417 A.2d 505, 512 (NJ. 1980) (stating that in some instances ethical
codes may contain public policy). But cf Sullivan v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co.,
802 F. Supp. 716, 727 (D. Conn. 1992) (stating that ethical codes in security industry do
not have the force of law and, thus, are not a source of public policy); Suchodolski v.
Michigan Consol. Gas Co., 316 N.W.2d 710, 712 (Mich. 1982) (ethical codes created by
private association does not establish public policy).
105. This is not to deny that professional employees face difficult dilemmas. Unlike
other employees, professional employees confront conflicts between their codes of ethics
and their positions as at will employees. Conflicts are created by codes that impose upon
professionals special duties and responsibilities which extend beyond those required by
law. Noncompliance with these obligations can result in the revocation of a license to
practice in the profession, disciplinary proceedings, and, under certain circumstance, civil
and criminal penalties. When faced with an employer's demand, a professional employee
may have to decide between continuing employment or violating his code of ethics. But
cf Sara A. Corello, Note, In-House Counsel's Right to Sue for Retaliatory Discharge, 92
COLuM. L. REv. 389 (1992) (arguing that in-house attorneys should be able to sue for
retaliatory discharge for refusing to violate their ethical code); Alfred G. Felui, Note,
Discharge of Professional Employees: Protecting Against Dismissal for Acts Within a
Professional Code of Ethics, 11 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 149, 177-80 (1979-1980)
(arguing that ethical codes should be a source of public policy).
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apply only to members of a profession."s Such codes provide
professions with a mechanism by which to self-regulate. 7 They
establish standards used against professionals in cases of malpractice or negligence.' 5 While professionals swear to abide by their
profession's code of ethics, employers generally do not take such
an oath. Thus, they should not be bound by a professional's ethical
code.

In some cases, the employer may be part of the profession and
may be required to abide by the profession's code of ethics,"°
however, even under these circumstances, ethical codes should not
be a source of public policy because they are often too vague."'
Many provisions simply contain broad statements of general policy
106. See WOLFRAM, supra note 6, at 48-49 (discussing purposes of ethical codes);
Criton A. Constantinides, Note, Professional Ethics Codes in Court: Redefining the Social
Contract Between the Public and the Professions, 25 GA. L. REv. 1327, 1339-41 (1991)
(discussing the purpose of ethical codes).
107. See Constantinides, supra note 106, at 1334-39 (discussing the means and justifications of self-regulation).
108. The Model Rules state that:
MViolation of a Rule should not give rise to a cause of action nor should it
create any presumption that a legal duty has been breached. The Rules are
designed to provide guidance to lawyers and to provide a structure for regulating conduct through disciplinary agencies. They are not designed to be a basis
for civil liability.
MODEL RuLmS OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr Scope (1992). Similarly, the Model Code
states that the Code does not "undertake to define standards for civil liability of lawyers
for professional conduct." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Preliminary
Statement (1983). Despite these statements, courts have used the ethical codes to establish
standards with which to measure lawyers' conduct for civil liability purposes. See, e.g.,
Woodruff v. Tomlin, 616 F.2d 924, 936 (6th Cir.) (Rules of Professional Responsibility
do not define standard for civil liability, but they are some of evidence of required conduct), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 888 (1980); Lipton v. Boesky, 313 N.W.2d 163, 166-67
(Mich. CL App. 1981) (violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility is rebuttable
evidence of malpractice); see also WOLFRAM, supra note 6, at 51-53 (discussing application of ethical codes in the civil context); Charles W. Wolfram, The Code of Professional
Responsibility as a Measure of Attorney Liability in Civil Litigation, 30 S.C. L. REV. 281,
286-95 (1979) (giving justifications for widespread use of the Code in civil suits);
Constantinides, supra note 106, at 1354-66 (discussing the use of professional codes of
ethics in civil actions).
109. For example, law firms are typically managed by partners who are attorneys, and
employ law associates. All are bound by the state ethical code governing attorneys.
110. This is not to suggest that ethical codes never provide clear cut answers. Rather, it
is to assert that ethical codes and the provisions within each code vary in scope and
specificity and are often subject to various interpretations. See generally RENA A. GORLIN,
CODES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBLIY (2d ed. 1990) (containing ethical codes for
different professions). As a result, they are difficult to use as a source of public policy.
Cf. Constantinides, supra note 106, a, 1348-53 (discussing the vagueness and scope of
ethical codes in the context of civil cases against professionals).
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which are vulnerable to subjective interpretations."' As a result,

they provide little guidance for the employer and greater opportunity for a discharged employee to sue. Ethical provisions which are
discretionary only exacerbate this problem. Using ethical codes as
embodiments of public policy raises several difficult questions for
which courts have given, at best, ambiguous answers. Among these
questions are: Who interprets the ethical provisions and decides
what is and what is not a violation? Is it enough that the employee
subjectively believes that following the employer's request is a
violation of his ethical code or must the action truly be a violation? Which provisions in ethical codes constitute public policy and
how is a court to decide?
No court has found a public policy exception simply by relying
on an ethical provision, calling into question a court's ability to
effectively use them as a source of public policy. Rather, courts
have either denied the cause of action"' or found a public policy
exception3 based upon an ethical provision which is supported by a

statute."
A leading case involving ethical codes and wrongful discharge
based upon the public policy exception is Pierce v. Ortho Pharma-

ceutical Corp."4 The case and the court's opinion illustrate the
problems which are created when ethical codes are used as a
source of public policy. In Pierce, the plaintiff, a physician, argued
that her employer fired her for refusing to violate her ethical code.
111. For example, Rule 102 of the Code of Professional Conduct of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants provides that "[in the performance of any professional service, a member shall maintain objectivity and integrity, shall be free of conflicts
of interest, and shall not knowingly misrepresent facts or subordinate his or her judgment
to others.

'

CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcT OF AMERICAN INSITU'E OF CERTIFED

PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS Rule 102 (1988). Rule 501 states "[a] member shall not commit an
act discreditable to the profession." CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDuCr Rule 501 (1988).
Similarly, the Code for Nurses contains broad provisions, for instance, "[the nurse provides services with respect for human dignity and the uniqueness of the client... .
CODE FOR NURSES 1 (1985).
112. See, e.g., Suchodolski v. Michigan Consol. Gas Co., 316 N.W.2d 710, 712 (Mich.
1982) (holding that the code of ethics for auditors is not a source of clearly mandated
public policy); Warthen v. Toms River Community Memorial Hosp., 488 A.2d 229, 234
(NJ. Super. CL App. Div. 1985) (denying a cause of action for wrongful discharge based
an the Code For Nurses), cert. denied, 501 A.2d 926 (NJ. 1985); Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 417 A.2d 505, 514 (NJ. 1980) (granting summary judgment in a case
where the plaintiff asserted an ethical code to be a source of public policy).
113. See, mg., Kalman v. Grand Union Co., 443 A.2d 728, 730 (NJ. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1982) (holding that a pharmacist's code of ethics and a state statute are two sources
of public policy).
114. 417 A.2d 505 (NJ. 1980).
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She asserted that continuing development of loperamide, a liquid
drug, violated her interpretation of the Hippocratic Oath because
the proposed formula contained saccharin, a controversial ingredient."' The trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary
judgment." 6 The Appellate Division reversed and remanded, stating that the grant of summary judgment had been premature and
that a full record was required." 7 The New Jersey Supreme Court
reversed and reinstated the summary judgment granted by the trial
s
court."
The court held that ethical codes could be a source of public
policy under certain circumstances." 9 Without describing these
circumstances, the court determined that Pierce's reliance upon the
Hippocratic Oath did not meet the clearly mandated public policy
standard. The provision upon which she relied read "I will prescribe a regimen for the good of my patients according to my
ability and my judgment and never do harm to anyone.""' The
court stated that such general language did not prohibit the research being conducted by Ortho.''
The court then found that Pierce's position was based upon her
personal morals and that she, in essence, wanted the research on
loperamide stopped due to the controversial nature of the drug."
To allow the personal beliefs of professional employees to dictate
which projects end and which continue would result in "chaos."
The court explained:
[A]n employee does not have a right to continued employment when he or she refuses to conduct research simply
because it would contravene his or her personal morals. An
employee at will who refuses to work for an employer in

115. Id. at 507. Continuing development meant that Ortho would file an application
with the Federal Food and Drug Administration (FDA), continue lab testing, and begin
work on a formulation. FDA approval would allow Ortho to test the new drug on humans. However, approval was required before such testing could be conducted. Id. at 507.
Despite the need to obtain FDA approval, Pierce continued her opposition to the development of loperamide.
116. Id. at 506.

117. Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 399 A.2d 1023, 1026-27 (NJ. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1979), rev'd, 417 A.2d 505 (NJ. 1980).
118. Pierce, 417 A.2d at 506.
119. Id. at 512.
120. Id. at 513.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 513-14.
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answer to a call of conscience should recognize that other
employees might heed a different call."
Pierce illustrates the questions and ambiguities created by the
use of ethical codes as sources of public policy. 4 Pierce felt that
continuing work on the drug would require her to violate her ethical code. Pierce's supervisor, another doctor, disagreed. Who is to
decide and must there really be a violation? Assuming there was
no ethical violation, should it be sufficient that Pierce thought she
would have to violate her ethical code? This raises the difficult
distinction between personal beliefs and ethical obligations. Finally,
not all ethical provisions meet the standard of the public policy
exception. The court left unanswered exactly when a provision rises
to the level of public policy and how a court is to decide. With
these questions unanswered, the obligations of employers and employees are made more unclear by including ethical codes as a
possible source of public policy.
After identifying an appropriate source of public policy, the
plaintiff should have to demonstrate that the implicated public
policy is specific. Not all statutory or constitutional provisions or
administrative rules contain a public policy sufficient to support a
claim of wrongful discharge based upon the public policy exception. Rather, the employee must show that the policy is precise,

123. lL at 514.
124. Similar issues were raised in Warthen v. Toms River Community Memorial Hasp.,
488 A.2d 229, 229 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985). The plaintiff, Corrine Warthen,

brought a claim against her employer alleging that she had been wrongfully discharged for
her refusal to dialyze a particular patient. Warthen, a nurse, refused to perform the procedure because the patient had suffered cardiac arrest and severe internal hemorrhaging

during two prior dialysis procedures. She explained to her supervisor that she had "moral,
medical, and philosophical objections" to performing the dialysis on the particular patient.
Id. at 230. The supervisor reassigned Warthen. Later that summer, Warthen was asked to
perform the procedure on the same patient. Warthen again refused. The head nurse
warned that Warthen would be terminated if she refused. Warthen refused and was discharged.
Warthen argued that her refusal to dialyze the patient was consistent with the code

for nurses and that the code embodied a public policy. The provision which she cited
stated, "the nurse provides services with respect for human dignity and the uniqueness of
the client unrestricted by considerations of social or economic status, personal attributes,
or the nature of health problems." Id. at 233. The Superior Court of New Jersey found
that this provision "define[d] a standard of conduct beneficial only to the individual nurse
and not to the public at large:' Id. The clearly mandated public policy of preserving life
outweighed the policy in the code's provision which recognized a nurse's right to refuse
to participate in a procedure that she thought threatened human dignity. Further, to allow
a nurse to refuse to perform certain duties based upon personal beliefs and morals would
disrupt the administration of a hospital. ld. at 234.

1066

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 44.1043

and not simply a general statement of broad policy."s The employee must also demonstrate that his or her refusal to violate the
policy was reasonable not simply a result of the employee's subjective interpretation of the policy source. By requiring the public
policy to be specific, not only will employees be prevented from
invoking general and broad statements of public policy to support
their claims, but the ability of the courts to invent public policies
will be constrained.
The effects of such a limit on the public policy exception are
illustrated by Lampe v. PresbyterianMedical Center." In Lampe,
the court held that broad policies contained in statutes which created the State Board of Nursing and gave it authority to discipline
negligent nurses did not establish a claim for wrongful discharge."' Lampe worked as a nurse at Presbyterian Medical Center. She was responsible for determining the number of nurse staffing hours needed to run her unit." Lampe believed that her unit
required a large staff because the new staffing system instituted by
the hospital required the nurses to work long overtime hours and
the bed occupancy rate was high. At the same time, however, the
defendants asked Lampe to reduce the number of overtime hours in
her unit. Lampe did not comply, feeling that such a reduction in
hours threatened the welfare of her patients. 2 The court refused
to extend the tort of wrongful discharge based upon the public
policy exception in this case because it found that Lampe relied
upon a broad, general statement of policy. 3
The general claim in Lampe resembles the claim in Winkelman
v. Beloit Memorial Hospital.' Recall in Winkelman, the plaintiff,
125. See, e.g., Lampe v. Presbyterian Medical Ctr., 590 P.2d 513, 515 (Colo. Ct. App.
1978) (nurse failed to state a claim for wrongful discharge because the statute upon which

she relied stated a general, not specific policy); Hancock v. Express One Int'l Ins., 800
S.W.2d 634 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990) (plaintiff could not rely on state highway regulations
where regulations were not sufficiently specific to constitute a clear public policy mandate).
126. 590 P.2d 513 (Colo. CL App. 1978).
127. Id. at 515. The provision establishing the State Board of Nursing stated that "in
order to safeguard life, health, property and the public welfare . . . it is necessary that a

proper regulatory authority be established." Id. Lampe also relied upon the statute which
gave power to the Nursing Board "[t]o withhold, deny, revoke, suspend, or refuse to
renew any license . . . upon proof that such person . . . has negligently or willfully acted in a manner inconsistent with the health or safety of persons under her care." Id.
(quoting CoLO. REV. STAT. § 12-38-217 (1973)).
128. Id. at 514.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 515.
131. 483 N.W.2d 211 (Wis. 1992). See supra notes 98-103 and accompanying text
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a nurse, alleged that she was wrongfiffly terminated for refusing to
work in a unit for which she lacked adequate training. Like
Lampe, Winkelman pointed to a statute which provided that the
state Board of Nursing had the authority to revoke, limit, or suspend a nurse's license for negligent acts.' However, the crucial
difference is that Winkelman did not base her claim solely on this
general provision. Instead, a specific rule existed which supported
her claim. It stated that negligence included offering services for
which one was not qualified." In contrast, Lampe only cited to
broad language from which the court could not find support for her
claim.
A final hurdle which courts should require plaintiffs to overcome is a showing that the implicated public policy is fundamental,
in that the frustration of that policy threatens the public interest. It
is not enough that "a discharged employee's conduct was praiseworthy or... [that] the public may have derived some benefit
from it."'" The plaintiff must demonstrate that such discharges
endanger the public health, safety, or general welfare. Though this
raises the issue of what constitutes a threat to society, the requirement that the policy be fundamental is an attempt to limit the
public policy exception to those cases which involve discharges
that 5would actually have an adverse effect on the public if tolerat3
ed.1
For example, requiring that the discharge threaten the public
safety, health, and welfare would eliminate cases like Roxbery v.
Robertson & Penn, Inc.'36 In Roxberry, the plaintiff was an employee discharged for reporting that certain shirts had been washed
(discussing the Winkelman decision).
132. Winkelman, 483 N.W.2d at 213, 216. The provision upon which Lampe relied
similarly empowered the state Board of Nursing. Lampe v. Presbyterian Medical Ctr., 590

P.2d 513, 515 (Colo. Ct. App. 1978).
133. Winkelman, 483 N.W.2d at 213.
134. Brockmeyer v. Dunn & Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 834, 840 (Wis. 1983) (emphasis
added).
135. See, e.g., Roxberry v. Robertson & Penn, Inc., No. 91-3330, 1992 WL 102551, at
*3 (10th Cir. May 15, 1992) (holding that the plaintiff did not establish a cause of action
in a wrongful discharge action); Campbell v. Ford Indus. Inc., 546 P.2d 141, 145 (Or.
1976) (holding that statutory right to examine corporation's books is not substantial public
policy because its purpose is to protect private and proprietary interests of the stockholder).
136. No. 91-3330, 1992 WL 102551 (loth Cir. May 15, 1992). The court did not focus

on the public policy involved, but rather whether the plaintiff failed to state a cause of
action because she reported the violation to the victim and not company officials or law
enforcement.
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rather than dry-cleaned in violation of a contract. Although the

plaintiff acted admirably by reporting the contractual violation, no
fundamental public policy was threatened. Rather, the violation
involved the interests of the parties to the contract, not the public.
Whether the shirts were washed or dry-cleaned did not threaten the
public.
After demonstrating that a discharge violates a specific and
fundamental public policy evidenced by a statutory or constitutional
provision or administrative rule which has the full force of the law,
the plaintiff must then show that his discharge undermines or frus-

trates that public policy.
I.

WRONGFUL DISCHARGE CLAIMS BY

ATrORNEYS

Over the past eight years, attorneys have brought several
wrongful discharge claims based upon the public policy exception.
Courts have resolved these cases in several different ways.'37
Some courts barred such suits due to plaintiffs' status as attorneys,
regardless of whether a clearly mandated public policy was involved."' Other courts avoided expansion of the public policy
exception to attorneys, but provided protection by finding a breach
of contract,' and still other courts allowed suits by attorneys under state whistleblower statutes."' The issue these cases either

137. See supra note 3 (noting that for the purposes of this Note, no distinction is being
drawn between wrongful discharge based upon public policy and retaliatory discharge).
138. See, e.g., Willy v. Coastal Corp., 647 F. Supp. 116, 118 (S.D. Tex. 1986) (refusing to extend the public policy exception to cover an attorney who believed he was asked
to violate the law), rev'd, 855 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir. 1988); Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 584
N.E.2d 104, 107 (Il1. 1991) (holding that an in-house counsel had no cause of action for
retaliatory discharge when his employer discharged him for reporting the employer's sale
of defective kidney dialyzer machines); Herbster v. North American Co. for Life & Health
Ins., 501 N.E.2d 343, 348 (111.App. Ct. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 850 (1987) (holding that in-house counsel had no cause of action for retaliatory discharge despite being
terminated for refusing to destroy discovery documents).
139. See, e.g., Mourad v. Automobile Club Ins. Ass'n, 465 N.W.2d 395, 396 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1991) (attorney stated claim for breach of just cause contract); see also Nordling v.
Northern State Power Co., 478 N.W.2d 498, 502 (Minn. 1991). The court in Nordling
held that the attorney-client relationship did not bar a breach of contract claim by the
attorney against his employer as long as the attorney-client relationship was not compromised. lId It explained that an "in-house attorney is also a company employee, and we
see no reason to deny the job security aspects of the employer-employee relationship if
this can be done without violence to the integrity of the attorney-client relationship." Id.
Issues regarding the employee-employer aspect of the relationship are less likely to involve or threaten the special attributes of the attorney-client relationship. Id.
140. See, e.g., Nordling, 478 N.W.2d at 504 (holding that consideration of the attorneyclient relationship was unnecessary because, as a matter of law, there was no violation of
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raise or side-step is whether, like other employees, attorneys should
be able to bring wrongful discharge suits based upon the public
policy exception.
A. Breach of Contract
Some courts allowing wrongful discharge suits by attorneys
have avoided the nebulous public policy exception by finding that
the plaintiff stated a claim for relief based upon a breach of contract.m This approach suggests that courts want to provide protection for attorneys while limiting the remedies to contract
remedies.'4 However, the overreaching implications of finding
implied-in-law obligations demonstrate that it is not an adequate
solution.
In Mourad v. Automobile Club Insurance Association,43 the
court upheld a judgment in favor of an attorney employed by an
insurance company who was fired for refusing to violate his code
of ethics." The attorney successfully argued that his discharge
breached an implied just cause contract. On appeal, the court found
that the jury did not err by finding that the defendant's policy
manual had established a just cause contract and that the employer
had no cause to demote the plaintiff when he refused to violate his
code of ethics.'45 The court acknowledged that the ethical code
only bound attorneys, however, it stated that employers could indireedy bind themselves by hiring an attorney and agreeing not to
terminate him without cause." Since the plaintiff could not recover under both a breach of contract theory and a retaliatory dis-

the state whistleblower statute); Parker v. M & T Chemicals Inc., 566 A.2d 215 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989) (attomey-client relationship did not preclude retaliatory discharge

claim by attorney based upon the New Jersey whistleblower statute).
141. See, e.g., Wieder v. Skala, 609 N.E.2d 105, 105 (N.Y. 1992) (finding attorney had
a valid wrongful discharge claim against his law firm for breach of contract); Mourad,
465 N.W.2d at 395.
142. Contract remedies for wrongfully discharged employees are generally limited to the
salary the employee would have made less the income earned through the employee's
mitigation efforts. See JoHN D. CALAmARi & JOSEPH M. PERIu.o, ComRtAcrs § 14-18
(3d ed. 1987). There are several limitations on contract damages. The most important for
the purposes of this Note is that, regardless of bad motive for the breach of contract,
punitive damages ae generally not awarded as in tort actions. See E. ALLAN
FARNSWORTH, CoNTRActs

§ 12.8 (2d ed. 1990); see also Brockmeyer v. Dunn &

Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 834, 841 (Wis. 1983) (limiting wrongful discharge damages to
contractual remedies).
143. 465 N.W.2d 395 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991)
144. Id. at 403.
145. Id. at 398.
146. Id. at 400.
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charge theory, the court declined to address whether an attorney
could bring a retaliatory discharge claim against his employer for
refusing to violate his code of ethics."
In another case, Wieder v. Skala," a law firm associate
brought a wrongful discharge suit against his firm. Wieder, a law
associate, informed senior partners in his firm that another associate
had made false, material misrepresentations and asked the firm to
report the misconduct to the appropriate disciplinary committee as
required by the Code of Professional Responsibility.4 9 The partners did nothing.' After further insistence by Wieder, the firm
finally submitted a misconduct report."' Wieder remained employed, but several days after he filed motions in an important
case, the firm terminated him." 2 Wieder then filed a wrongful
discharge suit."
The court refused to recognize the tort of wrongful discharge
based upon the public policy exception, stating that such changes
in employment relationships were for the legislature to decide. 54
However, the court did find that Wieder stated a claim for breach
of contract.
We agree with plaintiff that in any hiring of an attorney as
an associate to practice law with a firm there is implied an
understanding so fundamental to the relationship and essential to its purpose as to require no expression: that both the
associate and the firm in conducting the practice will do so
in accordance with the ethical standards of the profession.
Erecting or countenancing disincentives to compliance with
the applicable rules of professional conduct, plaintiff contends, would subvert the central professional purpose of his
relationship with the firm-the lawful and ethical practice
55
of law.'
The court stated that the provision involved in this case was essen-

147. Id. at 401.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

609 N.E.2d 105 (N.Y. 1992).
Id. at 106.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

154. Id. at 109.
155. Id. at 108.
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tial to the self-regulation and survival of the legal profession."'
However, it noted that not all ethical provisions established implied-in-law obligations.
Though the outcome in Wieder seems appropriate from a moral
or ethical stand point, the decision has far reaching implications
which show that finding an implied-in-law obligation and breach of
contract is not the appropriate solution to providing attorneys with
protection. The effect of Wieder has the potential to go well beyond its facts because the court stated an extremely broad rule
which was not limited by any particular facts in the case. In
Mourad, the jury decided whether a just cause contract existed
based upon the company's policy manual and whether the employer breached that contract. In contrast, the Wieder court found an
implied-in-law duty simply by relying upon the firm's hiring of the
plaintiff. It concluded "that in any hiring of an attorney as an
associate to practice law with a firm there is implied an understanding so fundamental to the relationship and essential to its
purpose as to require no expression."'" In other words, the court
is willing to find an implied-in-law
term between every law firm
58
and each of its law associates.1
Putting aside the breadth of the court's decision, other problems arise which lead to the conclusion that breach of contract
stemming from implied obligations is not an adequate solution. The
Wieder court left unanswered which ethical provisions established
implied-in-law obligations and how a court was to decide. It only
stated that not all ethical provisions were incorporated into the
contract.1 59 Without more explanation, law firms do not know
what the contract contains and, thus, what action will constitute a

156. Id.
157. Id.(emphasis added).
158. The breadth of this rule does not end with law firms and law associates. Rather,
carrying through the rationale of the court to its logical conclusion, it makes sense to find
implied-in-law obligations between other professional employees and their employers. For
instance, accountants and accounting firms are analogous to law associates and law firms.
Accounting firms him accountants to provide accounting services. These services, rendered
for the firm's clients, are "the very core and indeed, the only purpose" for the
accountant's association with the firm. Id. Arguably, from this association flows an implied duty on both parties to comply with the Code of Professional Conduct of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. According to Wieder, to find otherwise
undermines the very purpose of the professional relationship, namely the ethical practice
of accounting. Id The rationale of the court could be applied to other professionals such
as doctors and nurses.
159. Id.at 109.
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breach of contract. In fact, they cannot even guess or predict because the court provided no guidelines or standards by which to
judge what might be a breach. Assuming the issue of content is
resolved, using ethical codes as a basis for implied obligations still
creates problems which stem from deciding who is going to interpret the ethical provision and whether subjective belief of a violation is enough to support a breach of contract claim.ee
The reality of the Wieder decision seems to be that the court
wants to provide an incentive for attorneys to act ethically and
legally, but it wants to limit the remedy for discharge. However, in
an effort to limit the remedy, the court creates a tenuous and overreaching rule.
B. Public Policy Exception
In contrast to the courts which have used a contract theory to
protect attorneys, other courts have denied protection to attorneys
and refused to extend the public policy exception. The cases barring such suits illustrate the dilemma attorneys face when confronted with a choice between continuing employment and complying
with their code of ethics and demonstrate the unfair outcomes
caused by disparate treatment. In Herbster v. North American Co.
for Life & Health Insurance,"" Herbster, plaintiff and in-house
counsel, brought a suit for retaliatory discharge based on the allegation that his employer fired him for refusing to destroy or remove discovery information which supported claims of fraud being
brought against the employer. He argued that compliance with his
employer's demand would require him to violate certain provisions
in the Code of Professional Responsibility and the state statute
regarding obstruction of justice."e
After stating that "[tihere is no question that there are public
policy considerations in this case to support" the allegation that
Herbster's discharge contravened a clearly mandated public policy,

160. See supra notes 114-25 and accompanying text.
161. 501 N.E.2d 343 (11. App. Ct. 1986). cert. dented, 484 U.S. 850 (1987). But see
Dennis M. Nolan, Note, Herbster v. North American Company for Life and Health Insurance: Attorney's Retaliatory Discharge Action Unjustly Dismissed, 21 . MARSHALL L.
REV. 215 (1987) (criticizing the Herbster court for not adequately analyzing whether, in

certain instances, attorneys are employees); Nancy K. Renfer, Comment, Corporate
Counsels' Lack of Retaliatory Discharge Action, 10 N. ILL U. L. REV. 89, 98-105 (1989)
(discussing Herbster and its implications).
162. Herbster, 501 N.E.2d at 344.
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the court refused to extend the public policy exception.'" Explaining its refusal, the court distinguished Herbster from other
employees. First, although Herbster argued that he was not only an
attorney but also an employee, the court could not separate
Herbster's position as an employee from his profession. ' It
made clear that unlike other employees, Herbster was an attorney
subject to an ethical code. Second, the court stated that "unlike the
employees in the present retaliatory discharge cases, attorneys occupy a special position in our society."'" The court explained that
the attorney-client relationship places the attorney in a special
position to receive confidential information and to influence client
behavior. Given this relationship, the law imposes special obligations upon attorneys.'" Third, given the uniqueness of the attorney-client relationship, it is necessary for the client to have the
right to terminate the relationship for any reason or no reason.'67
At the same time, the court recognized attorneys have the right to
end the relationship as long as the client is not prejudiced. 6 '
After drawing distinctions between employees and attorneys
and emphasizing the important aspects of the attorney-client relationship, the court concluded that the public policy exception could
not be expanded to cover attorneys. Such expansion threatened the
"mutual trust' and confidential nature of the attorney-client relationship. ' 69
A case which relied heavily upon Herbster and which clearly
demonstrates the dangers of not protecting attorneys in some situations is Balla v. Gambro, Inc. 7' In Balla, an in-house attorney
brought a claim for retaliatory discharge against his former employer, Gambro, Inc. (Gambro). Gambro is a company which distributes
kidney dialysis equipment manufactured by Gambro Germany.
Balla was director of administration. He advised and represented
Gambro on legal matters and ensured that the company complied

163. Id.

164. rd. at 346.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 347.
167. Id. The unfettered right to terminate one's attorney "is implied in every contract of
employment and is deemed necessary because of the deeply embedded concept of the
confidential nature of the relationship between the attorney and the client and the evil that
would obviously be engendered by any friction or distrust." Id.
168. Id. at 348.
169. Id.
170. 584 N.E.2d 104 (1L.1991).
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with federal, state, and local regulations and laws."'
Gambro Germany sent a letter to Ganbro stating that it was
shipping kidney dialyzers which might present certain risks for
acute patients. Balla informed the company president of this information and stated that the dialyzers should be rejected for failing
to meet the standards of the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA)."7 The president rejected the shipment but one week later,
without informing Balla, told Gambro Germany it would accept the
dialyzers. When Balla discovered that the shipment had been accepted, he notified the president that he would do whatever was
necessary to stop the sale of the particular dialyzers.'7 Gambro
terminated Balla. The next day, Balla reported the shipment to the
FDA who seized the dialyzers and found them to be adulterated.174
After the trial court determined that Balla failed to state a
cause of action, the appellate court reversed in part, finding that a
material issue of fact existed as to whether Balla disclosed the
dialyzer information in his capacity as an attorney." The court
stated that there would be no question of Balla's standing to bring
the claim if he were not an attorney, 76 but that his status as an
attorney required the court to consider the nature and special attributes of the attorney-client relationship. The court articulated a
three-part test. First, if Balla learned of the dialyzer information" as
a layman, the attorney-client relationship was not threatened, and
Balla could bring the suit."7 Second, if it was unclear whether
Balla learned the information as a layman, then it was presumed
that he was acting in his capacity as an attorney. The court then
must consider whether the information was gained through the
attorney-client relationship and whether it was privileged. If not,
the suit could be brought. 8 Third, even if Balla was acting in
his capacity as an attorney and the information was privileged, the
court must consider other public policies which favor disclosure. It
noted:

171. Id. at 105.
172. Id. at 106.

173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 560 N.E.2d 1043, 1047 (i11. App. CL 1990). rev'd, 584
N.E.2d 104 (111.1991).

176. Id. at 1045-46.
177. Id. at 1046.
178. Id.
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The sanctity of the attorney/client privilege is not an absoAfter balancing the competing
lute bar to disclosure ....
public policies of the attorney/client privilege versus protecting individuals from serious bodily harm or death, we
find clear support in favor of disclosing information when
the attorney reasonably believes it is necessary to prevent
serious bodily harm or death."
This test, in essence, means that even if a plaintiff is acting as
an attorney, he may still be able to bring a suit for retaliatory
discharge because the policies behind disclosure could outweigh the
policies supporting the attorney-client relationship. However, the
appellate court reduced the implications of its decision by stating
its support of the Herbster decision and distinguishing the facts of
the case before it."
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Illinois reversed the appellate
court and held that Balla had no cause of action, despite acknowledging that "it appear[s] ... this discharge was in contravention of
a clearly mandated public policy ...
(and that] 'Itihere is no

public policy more important or more fundamental than the one
favoring the effective protection of the lives and property of citizens."""' The court reviewed the Herbster decision and agreed
with the notion that in-house counsel do not have a claim for
retaliatory discharge. It based its decision on the purpose of the
tort of retaliatory discharge and the potential effects its expansion
could have on the attorney-client relationship."
The court explained that expansion of the exception was unnecessary because the public interest was adequately safeguarded by
the fact that attorneys are bound by an ethical code. The Rules of
Professional Conduct required Balla to report Gambro's intention to
sell the defective dialyzers."e Balla alleged and the FDA seizure
179. Id The court cited to Rule 4-101(c) of the Illinois Code of Professional Responsibility which mandated disclosure by attorneys when it appeared necessary to prevent client
action that would result in death or serious bodily harm. Rule 4-101(d)(3) also permitted
an attorney to reveal a client's intent to commit a crime. Id.
180. ld at 1047. It distinguished Herbster, first, by noting that Herbster was clearly
acting in his capacity as an attorney and, second, by stating that the public policy concerns recognized by Illinois courts were not implicated in Herbster.Id.
181. Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E2d 104, 107-08 (In. 1991) (citations omitted).
182. Id. at 108.
183. Id. at 109. The court quoted the provision upon which it relied: "Rule 1.6(b) of
the Rules of Professional Conduct reads: 'A lawyer shall reveal information about a client
to the extent it appears necessary to prevent the client from committing an act that would
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supported that the dialyzers could have caused serious bodily injury
or death. As a result, the court concluded that Balla had a duty to
report the sale. Though Balla contended that attorneys face a
choice between unemployment and violating their ethical code, the
court stated that there was no choice involved. Unlike other employees, attorneys were bound to follow their code of ethics." 4
The court raised other ethical considerations. The Rules required Balla to withdraw from representing Gambro if such representation would have violated his ethical code. Though Balla
argued that this view conflicted with difficult realities, the court
responded that "[hiowever difficult economically and perhaps emotionally it is for in-house counsel to discontinue representing an
employer/client, we refuse to allow in-house counsel to sue their
employer/client for damages because they obeyed their ethical
obligations.' ' 5
Besides being unnecessary, the court determined that extension
of retaliatory discharge to attorneys would have an adverse effect
on the attorney-client relationship. It described the confidential
nature of the relationship and expressed concern that allowing such
suits would inhibit the essential free flow of communication between attorney and client."e
Herbster and Balla demonstrate that the rationale behind barring wrongful discharge suits by attorneys is based upon the unique
relationship between attorney and client and the ethical code which
binds attorneys. However, these cases also illustrate the serious
dilemma confronted by attorneys who are employees. Namely
whether to follow their ethical code and be discharged for doing
so, or to remain employed. These cases also illustrate the unfairness of disparate treatment, while attorneys are denied protection
when a clearly mandated public policy is implicated, other employees are protected.

result in death or serious bodily injury."' Id. (citations omitted).
184. Id. at 109.
185. Id. at 110. The court added that it felt that the employer should not have to bear
the costs of an attorney following his code of ethics. Id.

186. Id. at 109. The court then addressed Balla's argument that he learned of the dialyzer information in his capacity as manager not attorney. The court found that no issue
of material fact existed because it was clear from the pleadings and depositions that Balla
was acting as Gambro's general counsel. Id. at 112.
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ALLOWING ATrORNEYS TO BRING WRONGFUL DISCHARGE

SUITS BASED UPON THE PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION

Attorneys disagree generally about whether they should have
the right to sue their employers for wrongful discharge. One attorney has stated, "[w]hy should others be protected and not me? It
makes me look like a hired gun [there] to protect bad guys ....
There are other public policies that are more important than attorney-client privilege or the duty of confidentiality."' 87 However,
another attorney argues, "[l]awyers can't do the kind of job they
need to do unless the client is open and candid and not afraid to
tell anything ....
To protect that important aspect, you need to
take away lawyers' rights that other people admittedly have."'8
Courts have not adequately considered how wrongful discharge
claims brought by lawyers fit into the public policy exception and
employment law. Most courts that have addressed the issue have
agreed that attorneys should not be given the right to sue for
wrongful discharge based upon the public policy exception, even if
the discharge implicates a public policy.' 9 Courts reason that extension of the public policy exception is unnecessary because the
public interest is sufficiently protected by the fact that attorneys are
bound by a code of ethics." They conclude that allowing such
suits would impair the confidential nature of the attorney-client
relationship and rely upon high sounding notions of professionalism
and the unexplained but accepted idea that attorneys have a "special" position in our society.'
187. Barbara Franklin, Whistleblower Firings: In-House Lawyers Debate Right to Sue
Employers, N.Y. U., Nov. 15, 1990, at 5.
188. I.
189. See, e.g., Willy v. Coastal Corp., 647 F. Supp. 116 (S.D. Tex. 1986), rev'd on
other grounds, 855 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir. 1988); Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104
(111.1991); Herbster v. North American Co. for Life & Health Ins., 501 N.E.2d 343 (M1.
App. Ct. 1986), cert. dented, 484 U.S. 850 (1987). But some courts have avoided the
public policy exception. See, e.g., Mourad v. Automobile Club Ins. Ass'n, 465 N.W.2d
395 (Mlch. CL App. 1991) (finding breach of just cause contract); Wieder v. Skala, 609
N.E.2d 105 (N.Y. 1992) (addressing breach of contract based upon implied-in-law obligation).
190. Willy, 647 F. Supp. at 118; Balla, 584 N.E.2d at 108-09; Herbster, 501 NE.2d at
346.
191. See, eg., Balla, 584 N.E.2d at 109-10 (noting that an extension of the tort of
retaliatory discharge would have a negative impact on the attorney-client relationship);
Herbster, 501 N.E.2d at 346-48 (finding the special nature of the attorney-client relationship to be sufficient grounds for refusing to allow an attorney's retaliatory discharge
claim).
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The articulation of these arguments has replaced analysis and
resulted in outcomes which are unsound. This Note does not deny
the truth of the courts' arguments regarding the attorney-client
relationship. Rather, it argues that despite their truth, under certain
circumstances, the public policy exception should be used to protect attorneys. After examining the arguments against extension of
the public policy exception over attorneys, it becomes clear that the
primary issue is the attorney-client relationship and the fear that
extension of the public policy exception to attorneys will impair
and threaten that relationship.
A plaintiff's status as an attorney does not nullify the rationale
supporting the public policy exception. Instead, it requires the
courts to modify their analysis in order to take into account the
attorney-client relationship. Rather than blindly asserting the importance of the attorney-client relationship and denying attorneys the
right to bring wrongful discharge suits based upon the public policy exception, courts should allow attorneys, who are also employees, to sue when they are discharged for refusing to contravene a
clearly mandated public policy. If the plaintiff meets the public
policy standard and if the court can provide protection without
severely impairing the attomey-client relationship, then the court
should allow the suit to proceed.'" In essence, this approach requires the courts to weigh the policies supporting the special nature
of the attorney-client relationship and the policies supporting disclosure. Courts may find that under certain circumstances the attorney-client relationship is not even threatened.' 93
A.

Reliance Upon Ethical Codes

Courts justify their refusal to extend protection to attorneys
under the public policy exception, in part, by claiming that extension of the exception is unnecessary because attorneys are bound
by a code of ethics which adequately protects the public. 4 This
rationale is irreconcilable with cases involving other types of professional employees, 95 and it ignores the reality that attorneys

192. The Appellate Court in Balla suggested such an approach as the third prong of its
test. See supra notes 179-80 and accompanying text.
193. For example, in Wieder, the law associate's suit did not threaten any attorney-client
relationship. See also infra notes 241-45 and accompanying text.
194. See, e.g., Willy, 647 F. Supp. at 118; Balla, 584 N.E.2d at 108-09.

195. See, e.g., Kalman v. Grand Union Co., 443 A.2d 728 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1982) (noting that courts have allowed wrongful discharge claims by pharmacists despite
the fact that they are bound by a professional code of ethics); see also infra notes 202-24
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who are employees are "no less human than nonattomeys and,
thus, no less given to the temptation to either ignore or rationalize
away their ethical obligations when complying therewith may render them unable to feed and support their families.' 96
Non-professional employees are bound by rules of law. Courts
reason that allowing employees to bring wrongful discharge suits
based upon the public policy exception provides them with protection they need to challenge an employer's unreasonable demands or
unfair treatment." Having the right to sue in such circumstances
does not provide an incentive to sue an employer, but instead
provides an incentive to act lawfully, in the public interest, and
within one's rights. This protection is necessary since employees
are vulnerable to employers' abuses of power.
With the exception of attorneys, courts apply similar reasoning
to professional employees because professional and non-professional
employees are often similarly situated. 98 For example, professional employees receive their income and benefits from one source.
Employers have the power to demote professional employees or, at
least, foreclose them from advancement. The working environment
of professional employees can be made intolerable so they are
forced to resign. Finally, mobility in the job market is often limited, thereby, providing fewer alternatives and opportunities for professional employees. As a result, professional employees, like other
employees, are susceptible to employer coercion.
Given that professionals are not free from employer abuses of
power, courts are willing to hear their claims and to provide protection when plaintiffs demonstrate a violation of a clear public
policy mandate.' 99 In Winkelman v. Beloit Memorial Hospital, the

and accompanying text.
196. Ralla, 584 N.E.2d at 113 (Freeman, J.,
dissenting).
197. See supra notes 24-36, 60-62 and accompanying text.
198. See, e.g., Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 417 A.2d 505, 512-13 (NJ. 1980)
(indicating a willingness to allow doctors to bring wrongful discharge claims based on the
public policy exception); Warthen v. Toms River Community Memorial Hosp., 488 A.2d
229, 231-32 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985) (finding that although a nurse had failed to
demonstrate that her discharge violated a public policy, the public policy exception to at
will employment did extend to the nursing profession).
199. Blades recognized the professional's dilemma and offered some compelling examples:
Consider, for example, the plight of an engineer who is told that he will lose
his job unless he falsifies his data or conclusions, or unless he approves a
product which does not conform to specifications or meet minimum standards.
Consider also the dilemma of a corporate attorney who is told, say in the
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court held that the plaintiff, a nurse, stated a cause of action when
she alleged that the hospital terminated her for refusing to render

services for which she was not qualified. In another case, a
nurse stated a cause of action under the public policy exception because she was terminated for providing information to a commission established by the state to protect the rights of the mentally
i1.3° In Kalman v. Grand Union Co.,' the court held that a
pharmacist who refused to violate a state law by closing a pharma-

cy stated a claim of wrongful discharge under the public policy
exception.

Many

professionals,

including

doctors.'

nurses,

accountantsn °s

and
have failed to articulate a clearly mandated
public policy, and courts have dismissed their claims. However,
these dismissals illustrate that courts provide professional employees, with the exception of attorneys, with the opportunity to present
their claims and to argue that their discharges have violated public
policy.

context of an impending tax audit or antitrust investigation, to draft backdated
corporate records concerning events which never took place or to falsify other
documents so that adverse legal consequences may be avoided by the corporation; and the predicament of an accountant who is told to falsify his
employer's profit and loss statement in order to enable the employer to obtain
credit.
Blades, supra note 27, at 1408-09 (citations omitted).
200. See supra notes 98-103 and accompanying text.
201. Witt v. Forest Hosp., Inc., 450 N.E.2d 811, 812-13 (1l. App. Ct. 1983) (upholding
lower courts finding that plaintiff's discharge for communications with the Guardianship
and Advocacy Commission violated public policy); see also Sides v. Duke Hospital, 328
S.E.2d 818, 826-27 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that a nurse stated a wrongful discharge claim when she alleged that she was discharged for refusing to testify falsely
during a medical malpractice trial).
202. 443 A.2d 728 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1982).
203. See, e.g., Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 417 A.2d 505 (NJ. 1980) {holding
that a doctor failed to demonstrate that her ethical code contained a clearly mandated
public policy).
204. See, e.g., Lampe v. Presbyterian Medical Ctr., 590 P.2d 513 (Colo. CL App. 1978)"
(holding that broad policies contained in statutes did not satisfy the clearly mandated
public policy standard); Warthen v. Toms River Community Memorial Hosp., 488 A.2d
229 (NJ. Super. CL App. Div. 1985) (holding that plaintiff failed to demonstrate that her
discharge violated a clearly mandated public policy embodied in the ethical code governing nurses).
205. See, e.g., Naqvi v. Oudensha America, Inc., 702 F. Supp. 671 (N.D. 1l1. 1988)
(stating that the Internal Revenue Code did not establish a public policy upon which
plaintiff could base his wrongful discharge claim), rev'd, 847 F.2d 531 (7th Cir. 1990);
Suchodolsld v. Michigan Consol. Gas Co., 316 N.W.2d 710 (Mich. 1982) (stating that the
case involved a corporate management dispute and that plaintiff failed to articulate a fundamental public policy).

19951

PROTECTINGATORNEYS

1081

Two inferences can be drawn from the fact that courts allow
professionals to bring wrongful discharge claims based upon the
public policy exception. First, it suggests that courts do not think
that ethical obligations alone are enough to compel professionals to
act legally and ethically. Given the importance of employment,
when faced with the choice of continued employment or compliance with an ethical provision, the professional may ignore or
rationalize away the ethical obligation. Second, given this lack
of confidence in ethical codes, courts allow professionals to use the
public policy exception in an effort to eliminate the fear of discharge and to provide an incentive for the professional to act legally and ethically, thereby, protecting the public interest.'
The rationale behind cases involving professional employees is
inconsistent with the rationale behind cases involving attorneys who
rely upon ethical codes and obligations. On the one hand, courts
contend it is unnecessary to extend the public policy exception to
cover attorneys who are employees because they are bound by an
ethical code which protects the public interest.20 They have to
follow their ethical obligations, even if it means the loss of employment. On the other hand, courts allow all other professional
employees who are bound by ethical codes to bring such claims in
order to encourage them to act ethically and legally. Recognizing
the difficult dilemma, courts provide an incentive to professional
employees to act in the public interest.
This inconsistency can be illustrated by considering Kalman v.
Grand Union Co.' In Kalman, a New Jersey appellate court reversed the lower court and held that the plaintiff's claim for
wrongful discharge based upon the public policy exception was
supported by a state statute and the plaintiff's professional code of

206. See, e.g., Pierce, 417 A.2d at 512 (finding that the public policy exception to the
at will rule should apply to professional employees, in part so that professionals will
know that their jobs are secure when they act in accordance with a clear mandate of
public policy).
207. Id,

208. For example, an ethical code might require an attorney to voluntarily withdraw if
the attorney believes that his client is intent
EL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucT Rule
RESPONSIBILIrY DR 2-110 (1983); see also
Health Ins., 501 N.E.2d 343, 348 (II. App.

upon pursuing an illegal act. See, e.g., MoD1.16 (1992); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
Herbster v. North American Co. for Life &
Ct. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 850 (1987).

An ethical code may require an attorney to disclose information under certain circumstances. See, e.g., Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104, 109 (111.1991).
209. 443 A.2d 728 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1982).
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ethics." ' Kalman, a pharmacist, was discharged by his employer
for refusing to close the pharmacy, which according to a state
statute was required to remain open as long as the store remained
open. Kalman argued that his termination violated two sources of
public policy, a state statute and his code of ethics. The court
agreed that the statute expressed a clearly mandated public policy.
Closing the pharmacy created a danger to the public because without the presence of a pharmacist, unauthorized individuals might
gain access to the drugs"
The fact that the statute contained a clear public policy mandate provided the link necessary for the court to find that Kalman's
ethical code was also a source of public policy. According to the
provision in the Code of Ethics of the American Pharmaceutical
Association, a pharmacist "has the duty to observe the law, to
uphold the dignity and honor of the profession, and to accept its
ethical principles. He should not engage in any activity that will
bring discredit to the profession and should expose, without fear or
2 2 This profavor, illegal or unethical conduct in the profession."
vision supported Kalman's wrongful discharge claim because it
coincided with public policy in a state statute and justified his actions.2 3
This decision is irreconcilable with cases like Balla where the
court declined to extend the public policy exception to attorneys. In
Balla, an ethical provision required the attorney to disclose information. The court stated that "[i]n-house counsel do not have a
choice of whether to follow their ethical obligations as attorneys
licensed to practice law, or follow the illegal and unethical demands of their clients. In-house counsel must abide by the Rules
of Professional Conduct." 21 4 In stark contrast, the Kalman court
extended the public policy exception to include Kalman, even
though it "had no doubt that plaintiff was required by [the professional ethical code] to report defendant's attempt to flout state
regulations."1 " Despite Kalman's ethical obligation to act, the
court provided him with an opportunity to argue that he was

210. Id. at 731.
211. Id. at 730.
212. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting the Code of Ethics of the American Pharmaceutical

Association).
213. Id. at 730-31.
214. Balla, 584 N.E.2d at 109.
215. Kalman, 443 A.2d at 730.
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wrongfully discharged. If the rationale of the cases involving attorneys had been applied to the Kalman facts, extension of the public
policy exception would have been unnecessary because Kalman had
to adhere to the regulations and the professional code of ethics.
The inconsistent treatment of attorneys and other professional
employees would make sense only if attorneys were not similarly
situated or if courts assumed that attorneys cannot contemplate
ignoring their ethical obligations 6 However, like other professional employees, attorneys are susceptible to employer coercion.
Status as an attorney does not insulate one against employer abuses
of power which injure the public interest. Attorneys confront the
choice between following an employer's demands and compliance
with ethical codes. A corporation pressures its in-house counsel to
shred documents,2 or a law firm associate insists that his law
firm comply with disciplinary rules 18 In these situations, an employee-employer relationship exists and should not be ignored because attorneys are just as vulnerable to demands that contravene
public policy as other professionals. As one state bar association
asserted in a brief to a court, "[i]n today's legal market, the loss of
a job could be tantamount to the loss of a legal career; few attorneys are likely to comply with their ethical obligations in the face
of such economic coercion." 219
Assuming for the moment that the Balla court is correct and
that attorneys have no choice but to follow their ethical codes,
courts still need to extend the public policy exception to attorneys.
Ethical codes do not guarantee that the public interest is adequately
protected because not all ethical provisions are mandatory. In many
circumstances, the attorney can disregard or ignore the public interest without violating his code. The Balla court could argue that
because the Illinois ethical provision required the attorney to disclose, any added incentive to act ethically was redundant and un-

216. See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
217. See Herbster v. North American Co. for Life & Health Ins., 501 N.E.2d 343, 344
(I. App. Ct. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 850 (1987) (discussing claim for wrongful discharge in which the attorney was allegedly fired for refusing to shred documents).
218. See Wieder v. Skala, 609 N.E.2d 105, 106 (N.Y. 1992) (finding attorney had valid

claim against former law firm for discharging after he insistened that firm report colleagues misconduct).
219. Andrew Blum, The Dangers of Upholding Legal Ethics, NAT'L LJ., Nov. 2, 1992,
at 8, 8 (quoting from the brief of the New York Bar Association's Committee on Professional Responsibility).
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necessary. 0 However, when the ethical provision is discretionary,
as it is in many states, this argument is lost."t In such situations,
courts need to extend the public policy exception to attorneys in

order to provide an incentive for the attorney to act in the interest
of society.
In contrast to the provision in Balla,' the Model Code,
and many state ethical codesP4 contain disclosure provisions
which permit the attorney to disclose but do not mandate disclosure. In states adopting discretionary provisions, protection of the

public interest is tenuous because attorneys know that disclosure is
likely to result in the loss of employment.' When confronted
with such a large personal sacrifice, an attorney may be compelled
to remain silent. In doing so, he does not violate his ethical code

or any law. Thus, although an attorney can ethically do "what is
right and just," he may choose not to do so.
Reliance upon ethical provisions which permit or require an

attorney to withdraw ignores the economic situation of attorneys
who are employees.

6

Ethical provisions regarding withdrawal

were created to apply to private practitioners who have many clients and who are economically independent.?7 These attorneys

are-in a position to refuse their client's improper demands. In fact,
the threat of withdrawal provides them with leverage which can be

used to persuade their clients to act lawfully. However, attorneys

220. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
221. See infra notes 227-30 and accompanying text.
222. According to the Model Rules, "[a] lawyer may reveal [client] information to the
extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary" to frustrate a client's attempt to commit
an illegal act that is likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm. MODEL
RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr Rule 1.6(b)(1) (1992) (emphasis added).
223. The Model Code states that an attorney "may reveal . . . (t]he intention of his
client to commit a crime and the information necessary to prevent the crime. ' MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C(3) (1983) (emphasis added).
224. See STEPHEN GIui.ERS & Roy D. SIMON, JR., REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATtnES AND STANDARDS 59-62 (Little, Brown and Co. ed., 1993) (listing state variations
regarding disclosure).
225. In Balla, the court stated "(piresumably, in situations where an in-house counsel
obeys his or her ethical obligations and reveals certain information regarding the employedclient, the attorney-client relationship will be irreversibly strained and the client will
more than likely discharge its in-house counsel. Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 584 NY.2d 104,
110 (Ill. 1991).
226. See MODEL RuLES OF PROFSSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.16 (1994) (providing rules
for required disclosure); MODEL CODE OF PROFEsSIONAL RESPONSIIUTY DR 2-110 (1983)
(providing rules for required or discretionary withdrawal).
227. Lawrence Dubin & Donald Jolliffe, Recent Discharge Cases Focus New Attention
on Counsel as Employee, NAT'L L.J., May 20, 1991, at S2.
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who are employees are in a different position. Their employers
and
control issues of compensation, promotion, and tenure,
withdrawal provides them with little leverage. As a result, withdrawal, in essence, means unemployment.
Although withdrawal allows the attorney to terminate his relationship with the client, the public interest is not protected. The
court in Balla supported its refusal to recognize the attorney's
retaliatory discharge claim in part due to the state ethical provision
which governed an attorney's duty to withdraw. 9 It explained
that under the provision the plaintiff-attorney was required to withdraw. Similarly, in Willy, the court concluded:
[If an attorney believes that his client is intent upon pursuing an illegal act, the attorney's option is to voluntarily
withdraw from employment. When an attorney elects not to
withdraw and not to follow the client's wishes, he should
not be surprised that his client no longer desires his services.
However, withdrawal simply removes the attorney from the situation. It does not allow the attorney to protect the public interest.
Attorneys should not be denied the incentive given to other
professional employees to act legally and ethically merely because
they are bound by an ethical code. Such a code alone does not
adequately safeguard the public interest, regardless of whether it
contains mandatory or discretionary provisions. The courts themselves concede this point when they allow other professionals to
sue for wrongful discharge based upon the public policy exception.
B. Impairment of Attorney-Client Relationship
In essence, the issue of whether courts should permit attorneys
to bring wrongful discharge claims based upon the public policy
exception is rooted in the effect such suits have on the attorneyclient relationship. In Ilerbster and Balla, the courts described the
special attributes of the attorney-client relationship, stating that
"[tihe mutual trust, exchanges of confidence, reliance on judgment

228. See Nordling v. Northern State Power Co., 478 N.W.2d 498, 502 (Minn. 1991)
(recognizing that in-house counsel is also a corporate employee and stating that job security should not be denied if the attorney-client relationship is not impaired).
229. Balla, 584 N.E.2d at 110.
230. Willy v. Coastal Corp., 647 F. Supp. 116, (S.D. Tex. 1986), rev'd, 855 F.2d 1160
(5th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted).
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and personal nature of the attorney-client relationship demonstrate
the unique position attorneys occupy in our society."' In light of
the nature of this relationship and the negative impact distrust
would generate, the courts concluded that the client must have an
unrestricted right to discharge an attorney, despite the attorney's
position as an employee. Therefore, the public policy exception
should not be extended to cover attorneys.
The crux of this argument is that full and frank communication
between attorney and client is essential, and if attorneys are allowed to sue for wrongful discharge the flow of information will
be hampered
Clients may hesitate to turn to their attorney for
advice about questionable conduct knowing that their attorney
could use the information in a wrongful discharge suit. As a result,
instead of seeking legal advice, clients may go forward uninformeda Fear of wrongful discharge suits may discourage clients from being candid with their attorneys. Thus, attorneys will
provide legal advice without complete information. To avoid this
chilling effect, courts contend that clients must have an absolute
right to discharge their attorneys.
The Balla and Herbster courts raise valid concerns about the
attorney-client relationship. However, these concerns do not justify
an absolute bar to wrongful discharge suits brought by attorneys. 4 Such a rigid rule ignores two considerations. First, in
some instances, the attorney-client relationship is not threatened or
impaired. Second, under certain circumstances, the implicated public policy deserves more protection than the attorney-client relationship.

231. Herbster v. North American Co. for Life & Health Ins., 501 N.E.2d 343, 348 (11t.
App. Ct. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 850 (1987); see also Bala, 584 N.E.2d at 108
(Ill. 1991) (quoting Herbster); Donald R. Jolliffe, Privilege Is at Issue in Discharge
Claims, Client Confidentiality Raises In-house Concern, NAT'L LJ., Dec. 2, 1991, at S6
(discussing potential adverse effects stemming from retaliatory discharge suits by in-house
counsel).
232. But cf. Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 IOWA L REV. 351, 364

(1989) (criticizing the justifications for confidentiality).
233. See MODEL RuLEs OF PaO
LSsION
Comnucr Rule 1.6 cm. 2 (1994) (stating
that the purpose of confidentiality is to encourage individuals to seek legal advice early

and to promote full disclosure).
234. See Elliot M. Abramson, Why Not Retaliatory Discharge for Attorneys: A Polemic,

58 TENN. L REv. 271, 278 (1991) (stating that the "trust and confidence respecting the
attorney-client relationship is really just knee-jerk formalism" and that the relationship
should not bar attorneys from bringing retaliatory discharge suits).
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1. No Threat to the Attorney-Client Relationship
Expanding the public policy exception to attorneys does not
necessarily impair the attorney-client relationship. In cases where
there is no impairment, a court's refusal to extend the exception is
illogical. The facts of Wieder v. Skalae' present a case in which
an attorney-client relationship is not implicated. Wieder sued his
law firm for wrongful discharge. He alleged that he was discharged
for insisting that his firm report the misconduct of another attorney,
Mr. Lubin. In his complaint, Wieder stated that Lubin did some
legal work for him regarding the purchase of a condominium.
While rendering these services, Lubin allegedly neglected his duties, misled Wieder, 7 and made false statements about Wieder's
mortgage. 8 Under such facts, the sanctity of the attorney-client
relationship could not justify a court's refusal to extend the public
policy exception. Since Wieder disclosed the information, there is
no attorney-client relationship to protect.o 9
When an attorney-client relationship is involved, extending the
public policy exception to attorneys may still be appropriate because the relationship is not seriously threatened. In cases where
attorneys refuse to commit illegal acts, allowing suits based upon
the public policy exception will not reduce the flow of communication between the attorney and client, when the client is also the
employer. The client is not deterred from seeking legal advice
because the information conveyed by the client to the attorney is
still protected by the confidentiality rules. The attorney cannot

235. See supra notes 148-60 and accompanying text.
236. See David Margolick, New York High Court Backs Whistle-Blowing Lawyers, N.Y.

Thm, Dec. 22. 1992, at A12; Blum, supra note 219, at 8 (discussing the Wieder case).
237. See Margolick, supra note 236, at A12.
238. See Blum, supra note 19, at 8.
239. Wieder, in this case, was in the position of a client, and he chose to disclose
information regarding his relationship with Lubin. However, had there been a third party
client, the attorney-client relationship would have been more problematic. Under such circumstances, disclosure of client information would most likely be needed for the attorney
to prove his claim. Even under such circumstances, courts should not simply bar the suit.
Rather, they should consider whether the attorney-client relationship is implicated. For varios reasons, impairment of the relationship may be questionable. Issues regarding the employer-employee relationship may not threaten the attorney-client relationship. For example,
confidential client information may not have to be disclosed. If the client was harmed by
the improper conduct of the attorney, the client may not object to the use of the information. It may be that the attorney-client relationship is threatened, and an attorney should
be barred from bringing a wrongful discharge suit. However, before reaching this conclusion, the court should consider whether the attorney-client relationship is implicated.
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affirmatively act and use the information against the client, unless
permitted by his ethical code. Even when a client asks an attorney
to violate the law, the attorney cannot disclose that that request
was made. The right to sue is only triggered when the client terminates the attorney for refusing to participate in the illegal conduct.24 Thus, extending the public policy exception to attorneys
will not discourage open communication, but will discourage clients
from requesting their attorneys to violate the law. At the same
time, attorneys will be encouraged to refuse to participate in illegal
acts. This is fair given that all citizens, including the employer, are
governed and bound by the law.
Similarly, in cases where attorneys ethically disclose, permitting
wrongful discharge suits will not impair the attorney-client relationship. Allowing such suits will not reduce the flow of communication between client and attorney any more than the ethical provisions which require or permit disclosure. 4 The Model Code
states that an attorney "may reveal... [t]he intention of his client
to commit a crime and the information necessary to prevent the
crime."'242 In Balla, the ethical provision required the attorney to
disclose information when necessary to prevent the client from
committing an act that would cause serious bodily harm or
death?43" Regardless of whether attorneys can sue or not, the flow
of communication is already chilled by these exceptions to confidentiality. As the court in Balla stated, attorneys "do not have a
choice of whether to follow their ethical obligations as attorneys
licensed to practice law." Thus, courts need not be concerned
that permitting attorneys to bring wrongful discharge suits when
they ethically disclose will adversely affect the communication
between client and attorney.

240. For example, the attorney in Herbster brought a wrongful discharge suit alleging
that his employer, North American Co., terminated him for refusing to violate the law.
Had North American Co. not terminated Herbster, he would not have been able to sue
nor could he disclose their request that he destroy documents, unless permitted by the
state code of ethics.

241. Note that the attorney must be able to find the public policy not only in an ethical code but in a statute, institution, or administrative rule.
242. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSiONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)(3) (1983) (emphasis

added).
243. Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104, 109 (i11. 1991).
244. Id.
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2. Public Policies Outweighing the Policies Behind
the Attorney-Client Relationship
Exceptions to confidentiality signal that certain implicated pub-

lic policies deserve more protection than the attorney-client relationship. The attorney-client relationship is based upon trust and

confidence. However, the rules which protect that aspect of the
relationship are not absolute. The exceptions, adopted by the supreme court of each state, indicate that under particular instances,
the benefit of disclosure outweighs the benefit of confidentiality.
The ethical provision in Balla provided that "[a] lawyer shall reveal information about a client to the extent it appears necessary to
prevent the client from committing an act that would result in
death or serious bodily injury."245 Limiting disclosure to information necessary to prevent the crime demonstrates the court's reluctance to impinge upon the attorney-client relationship. However,
despite the limitation, by adopting this exception to client confidentiality, the Supreme Court of Illinois determined that protecting the
public against serious injury or death outweighed the policies behind the attorney-client relationship.2
The Model Rules place truthful testimony above the policies
behind the attorney-client relationship. Rule 3.3(a)(4) provides that
"[a] lawyer shall not knowingly ... offer evidence that the lawyer
knows to be false. If a lawyer has offered material evidence and

comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures."247 The comments explain that this rule requires

245. Id. (citation omitted). Other states have mandatory disclosure rules under certain
circumstances. For example, Connecticut and several other states require disclosure of
information to prevent serious violent crimes. GILLERS & SIMON, supra note 224, at 5962.
246. Exceptions to the confidentiality rule vary. The Model Code allows attorneys to
disclose a client's intent to commit a future crime. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(CX(3) (1983). The Model Rules has a narrower exception which
requires an attorney to disclose information necessary to prevent the client from committing a crime which will result in imminent death or serious bodily harm. MODEL RULES
OF PROFEssIoNAL CoNDuc'r Rule 1.6(b)(1) (1994). States have adopted modified versions
of these rules. Several states allow the attorney to disclose information necessary to prevent a client from committing a crime that will cause "substantial injury to the financial
interest or property of another." See Gn.LERS & SIMON, supra note 224, at 59 (analyzing
the disclosure requirements in various states). Other possible exceptions can exist regarding
perjured testimony.
247. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3(a)(4) (1994). States adopt
different provisions regarding perjury. See GILLEPs & SIMON, supra note 224, at 172-74
(discussing state provisions regarding perjury); see also MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
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the attorney to disclose to the court that his client has committed
perjury. "Such a disclosure can result in grave consequences to
the client,... [b]ut the alternative is that the lawyer cooperate in
deceiving the court, thereby subverting the truth-finding process
which the adversary system is designed to implement.2" 49 Thus,
under the Model Rules, the policies behind truthful testimony and
candor to the court outweigh the policies behind the attorney-client
relationship.
By creating exceptions to confidentiality rules, state supreme
courts signal that certain public policies are more important than
client confidentiality. If an attorney is fired for protecting such a
public policy and that policy is rooted in a statute, constitution, or
administrative rule, the attorney should be able to sue for wrongful
discharge. The argument that the confidentiality of the attorneyclient relationship bars such a suit is not valid, if in that state, it is
mandatory for the attorney to disclose under the circumstances. The
mandatory provision demonstrates the state supreme court determined that the public policy outweighs the confidentiality.
When the disclosure rule is not mandatory, the argument for
allowing attorneys to sue for wrongful discharge based upon the
public policy exception is still compelling. The fact that the disclosure is discretionary weakens the argument that the state supreme
court believes the policies behind the exceptions always outweigh
the policies behind the attorney-client -relationship. However, giving
the attorney the opportunity to disclose suggests that certain public
policies can be more important than the confidentiality between
attorney and client. Extending the public policy exception in these
cases is compelling because the attorney has a choice: protect the
public interest and lose one's job or stay silent and remain employed. Either way, the attorney acts ethically. Given the magnitude of the public policies involved, courts should provide the
incentive to attorneys to further the public interest.

RESPONSIBILrY DR 7-102(B) (1983) (containing the Model Code provisions regarding
perjured testimony).
248. Note that the Model Code differs from the Model Rules. It allows an attorney to
disclose his client's intention to commit perjury under DR 4-101(C)(3), the exception

which permits the attorney to reveal future crimes. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILtrrY DR 4-101(C)(3) (1983). While requiring an attorney to reveal that a person
other than his client has committed perjury, the Model Code does not allow the attorney

to disclose that his client committed perjury. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RSPONStBILmTY DR 7-102(B) (1983).
249. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3 cmt. 6 (1994).
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Courts are concerned about impairing the attorney-client relationship. However, despite this concern, a complete bar to suits
brought by attorneys is illogical. In some instances, the attorneyclient relationship is not threatened, and in others, the implicated
public policy outweighs the policies which support the sanctity of
the attorney-client relationship.
V.

CONSIDERATION OF THE AToRyEY-CLmNT RELATIONSHIP

In cases brought by attorneys, courts should take into account

the attorney-client relationship. After determining whether the attorney has met the clearly mandated public policy standard, courts
should consider whether protection of that public policy would
impair the relationship. If the attorney-client relationship is not
implicated, the suit should proceed. If, on the other hand, the attorney-client relationship is threatened, courts should weigh the magnitude of the public policy against the policies supporting the confidential nature of the attorney-client relationship. This approach
forces courts to analyze the circumstances rather than simply reiterate the importance of the attorney-client relationship and, on that
basis alone, dismiss the suit. Courts are not without guidance when
weighing public policies against the attorney-client relationship.
Provisions in the ethical codes suggest which public policies are so
important that they deserve protection.
CONCLUSION

Unlike all other employees, attorneys who are employees are
denied the opportunity to bring wrongful discharge claims based
upon the public policy exception. This denial cannot be justified by
the fact that attorneys are bound by an ethical code. First, such
reasoning is inconsistent given that- doctors, nurses, accountants,
and other professionals who are bound by ethical codes are permitted to bring claims based upon the public policy exception. Second, ethical codes do not guarantee that the public interest will be
protected since many provisions are discretionary. Third, refusing
to extend the public policy exception cannot always be justified by
concerns surrounding the attorney-client relationship. Under some
circumstances, there may be no relationship to protect or the relationship may not be threatened or impaired. In other instances,
countervailing public policies may outweigh the policies behind
protecting the sanctity of the attorney-client relationship. Evidence
of these public policies can be found in the exceptions to the con-
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fidentiality rules.
Rather than blindly asserting the importance of the attorneyclient relationship and ignoring the reality that some attorneys are
employees, courts should apply their public policy analysis and
take into consideration the attorney-client relationship. By extending
the public policy exception to attorneys, courts are not providing
attorneys with the incentive to sue. They are providing attorneys
with the incentive to act ethically and in the public interest.
CATHRYN

C. DAKIN

